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In January 1930 a meeting was held at Headman Koliwe's location in
Kentani district, Transkei. It was addressed by Elias Mabodla (or Agitator
No. 53 as he was identified in a police report) who had come "to preach ICU
amongst you people". He recounted how nine trade union leaders had been
arrested in East London where they had called a strike. Their plight evoked
strong sympathy in Kentani, especially as one of those arrested was a local
man, Dorrington Mqayi. Headman Nkonki summed up the mood of the meeting: "It
is for us to see into this matter as our blood is amongst those people in the
gaol at East London."
Fifty years later, during our research on rural popular movements we
encountered Mqayi in his identity as an ICU "agitator" in Kentani. We then
retraced his footsteps. In an archival echo of his journeys between the
Transkei and the harbour city, we moved from the boxes holding the records
of the Kentani magistracy to those of the East London Town Clerk. We had no
way of knowing whether Mqayi would resurface in the East London documents,
but began our search for him in speculative optimism. We did meet Mqayi
again - but not him alone. Mqayi in East London was not the leading actor that
he might have been on the smaller stage of Kentani; rather, he had a modest
speaking part in a vibrant urban drama - a drama recorded in the vivid and
detailed police records* of ICU activity in the Town Clerk's files.
Their six hundred.pages recreate the atmosphere of the dusty commonage
and the football field of the East Bank Location. In them one can hear
speeches - tedious and gripping, halting and eloquent, shot through with
sardonic humour,pent-up anger, and startling metaphorical flights -
accompanied by prayers, hymns, and nationalist songs. They capture the energy
of crowds of up to eight thousand people - or a gathering of fewer than two
dozen loyalists, dourly demonstrating their commitment. The murmurous voices
of these audiences, as well as the more fully recorded diction of the "agitators"
addressing them, still echo in the police reports. From both leaders and
followers it is possible to learn precise details of the pressures of existence
in an urban slum and of how these were resisted and survived. The documents
make audible not only the tensions, fears and frustrations of the menu peuple
but also something of their collective view of themselves and of their relations
with other communities - in short, their consciousness.
* These are described in the Note on Sources at the end of this essay.
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This essay attempts the historical reconstruction of that consciousness;
it explores the "complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble" of beliefs
and attitudes which it comprised. We hope that it also achieves something more
direct and less abstract: that it conveys a sense of the experience of the
people concerned, and that it remains faithful to the vivid, concrete and
passionate depiction by themselves of their lives and struggles.
(1) INTRODUCTION: EAST LONDON, TOWNSHIPS, HINTERLAND
The Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) was founded in Cape Town
in 1919 as a trade union, but in the mid-1920s it became the most effective mass-
based Black political movement in South Africa, attracting a large following
amongst the urban and rural poor. After several years of hectic growth that
saw membership reach perhaps 100,000, in 1929 the union fell prey to leadership
disputes, factionalism, and financial and organisational disarray; it declined
rapidly in numbers and influence. One of the successor factions, the Independent
ICU (IICU) had its major base in the Cape port of East London. Clements Kadalie,
founder of the original ICU, moved to the city and the IICU was stronger in the
Eastern Cape than anywhere else. Kadalie and his lieutenants alarmed the authoritit
and attracted their surveillance: between 1928 and 1933 detectives in East London
attended hundreds of ICU and IICU meetings and reported their proceedings. Through
this substantial record it is possible to recreate a good deal of the intentions,
tactics, and ideology of the ICU and IICU in East London in the late 1920s and
early 1930s.
The other chapters in this book all deal with rural political movements
and it might appear that a study of a trade union in an urban setting is an odd
companion piece. In fact, this exploration of urban popular ideology is linked
in a number of ways to the concerns and themes of earlier chapters. East London's
labouring population included a large proportion of people who retained homesteads
and access to land in rural areas, notably in the Ciskei and in the southern
Transkei. These migrant workers earned wages in East London, lodged there week
by week or for longer periods, and collectively they exhibited a consciousness
in which experience of town and countryside were both manifest. Immediate urban
concerns over wages, living conditions and pass laws were intertwined with
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anxieties about land, livestock and crops. There are thematic as well as
geographical links between town and country as perceived through the record
of the ICU and IICU in East London. In the harbour city as in rural districts,
there is a clearly discernible pattern of pressures being exerted on political
communicators from below. The interests and preoccupations of the labouring
poor in East London were not always the same as those of the trade union
officials - but the officials had to respond to those interests and to promote them
if they were to secure a popular following. The ICU/IICU in East London was to
be affected from below by mass action and by popular ideology in ways strikingly
similar to those remarked in some of the rural case studies in this book. Further-
more, the East London material suggests striking similarities in the content of
popular political consciousness in town and countryside during the 1920s - a new
consciousness being shaped in the context of increasingly segregationist state
policies.
To anticipate in broad outline the argument which is detailed below, we
suggest that the ICU/IICU in East London underwent a transition. It moved
away from an initial emphasis on organisational issues and from rather bureau-
cratic tactics to lay much.more stress on three other elements: an explicitly
Africanist position (strongly influenced by separatist Christianity); an
articulation of specific urban underclass grievances (especially those of
women); and an attempt to cobble together an alliance with popular forces in
the city's rural hinterland. This last aspect - the attempted urban/rural alliance
not only involved recruiting migrant workers and peasants under the IICU banner
but also meant accepting rural chiefs as an appropriate focus for mobilisation.
It was precisely because of the very strong links between East London's
labouring population and the rural hinterland, and because of the complex
nature of migrant worker consciousness, that there was a material interest behind
this kind of alliance. Thus there is revealed in the language and content of
the IICU speeches a complex interpenetration of different vocabularies and symbols
itself a reflection of the social diversity of the movement's mass base.
East London lies at the mouth of the Buffalo River, a natural harbour.
Founded in the mid-nineteenth century, it developed as a seaport, railhead,
and centre for the inland trade; by the early twentieth century it also housed
light manufacturing industries. Larger-scale industrialisation by-passed the
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city. In the 1920s and 1930s its was essentially an entrepot role:
economic activity centred on its harbour, railway, merchant houses, small
processing works, and craft shops. Central to the growth of the city
had been its market in African produce and goods for African trade. By
the 1920s its primacy as the wool-exporting port was under challenge; the
slump in the price of wool and the general depression in trade after 1929
accentuated an air of genteel shabbiness.
East London was the largest urban centre in the area of the Eastern
Cape known as "the Border". The name is significant. East London's
hinterland had been South Africa's most fiercely contested frontier zone.
Arena of a century's conflict between settlers and British troops and Xhosa
chiefdoms, it bore the brunt of the wars of 1850-53 and 1877-78, the Cattle
Killings of 1856-57, and the expropriations and population movements that
created the chequerboard racial demography of the region. The politics of
Africans in and around East London has, throughout the twentieth century,
been deeply imprinted with local awareness of the decisive and punitive
clashes in the nineteenth century.
This setting also shaped the identity of the black urban population of
East London. The city's "locations" (Black townships) were from early on in
their history the venue not only for migrants who retained homes in the
countryside, but also a receptacle for refugees from the overpopulated black
lands and capitalising white-owned farms. By the 1920s, the African population
of East London was concentrated in two squalid slums on both sides of the
Rooikrans river - East Bank and West Bank locations - the area of which had
been broadly determined in the 1880s. Population growth in these townships
was significant even before 1920 (see Table _1) but in that decade conditions
in the rural hinterland sped the influx of permanently urbanised as well as of
migrant workers to East London. By the twenties the process of rural
impoverishment in the Ciskei and southern Transkei had intensified; the middle
years of the decade witnessed a severe drought; and there were pressures (in
the form of harsher conditions and/or evictions) on labour tenants and cash
tenants on white-owned farms. In 1929 alone, there were over eleven hundred
immigrants from rural areas recorded as entering the city - and there were
undoubtedly otheis undetected in the statistics who entered in contravention
of municipal and state regulations. Between 1919 and 1928 the African
population of East London increased by 41.7 per cent; between 1925 and 1930
alone it rose by nearly 8500 - or an increase in five years of over 50 per cent
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Several features of the African population in East London are worthy of
note. Firstly, it was a. distinctly heterogenous population, and the most
significant cleavage was that between the urbanised, semi-urbanised and
wholly migrant sectors. Broadly, by the 1920s the urban population comprised
three overlapping categories: those who lived permanently in and knew no
other milieu than the city Locations; those who regarded themselves as rural
dwellers and were in the city on a strictly migrant basis; and a third or
marginal category whose decreasing access to rural livelihood of any sort was
impelling them firmly if reluctantly into the status of permanent urban
proletarians. These categories lack precision,- but as rough-hewn sociological
divisions they were recognised at the .time by white and black observers. As
to their relative size, an estimate in 1931 by the long-serving Location Super-
intendent Charles Lloyd was that about 20 per cent of the cityfs Africans "had
lost touch with their tribes". In 1935, the estimate for this urbanised group
was rather hiqher, at 30 per cent, with another 30 per cent "semi-urbanised" and
(2)40 per cent "rural".
Secondly, it was a population whose overwhelming majority endured material
conditions of deprivation and insecurity. If East London as a whole was
depressed by the late twenties, the racial division of wealth and power meant
that the social ills attendant on urban growth were concentrated in the East
and West Bank ghettoes. These were classic examples of urban slums thrown up
by rapid but uneven capitalist development. White municipal government and
rate-payers were resolutely indifferent to township conditions - unless they
threatened to affect health standards in "white" East London, to pose law and
order problems or to demand municipal expenditure. Even this deafness was
challenged on a number of occasions by inescapably acute evidence of poverty and
immiseration, so that a kind of recurrent scandal surfaced from year to year.
It did so at the end of 1929 when the report of the Medical Officer of Health
drew attention to the infant mortality rate in the city's locations: higher than
in any other urban centre in South Africa, it reached the "appalling" rate of 543
deaths per 1000 births in that year - for the decade as a whole it averaged over
333 per 1000. The provision of housing by the public authorities was
grotesquely inadequate? most homes were privately built of corrugated iron,
packing cases, and other salvaged material, and formed
honeycombs of crudely constructed rooms, usually opening
on a yard which itself could be dotted with low kennel-like
structures, used as kitchens by day and as sleeping quarters
by night for poorer families .... The location itself had an
ugly social complexity arising out of differential access to
property.
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Wage levels in East London were low, both in relation to those prevailing
in other urban centres and to the cost of living. Especially for the under-
employed and unemployed, life was a constant crisis of subsistence.
Thirdly, and to cope with the strains thus imposed, the township
dwellers developed a host of craft and "informal sector" activities. Some
sought precarious livings as vendors of fresh food {marketed from urban plots,
brought in from surrounding farms, or processed illegally - without licences -
so as to undercut city prices), carters, artisans, woodsellers,and the like.
Of particular importance to the township economy were two functions largely
carried out by women: the provision of lodgings for migrant males (and
sometimes for their dependants as well) and the brewing and sale of beer.
All these aspects - the fragmented nature of the urban labour force, the
strong rural links, the economic hardships and pressures of township life, the
centrality of housing and brewing as popular concerns - were to make themselves
felt politically, to press from below upon the IICU. They were to become part of
the consciousness and programme of the trade union activists in 1930.
By the 1920s, organised political acticity in the townships had a long
history and reflected their social divisions. Since the 1890s a quasi-
official "location committee" and a Vigilance Association (Iliso lomzi) had
operated; the former was dominated by the handful of black clergymen, teachers
and clerks who were also active in Voters' Associations and local branches of
the A.N.C. and Bantu Union. They played several roles. At times they acted
(or sought to act) as spokesmen for the black community as a whole, presenting
grievances through formal channels; sometimes they acted as mediators, as for
example striving to arbitrate during a strike; on yet other occasions their
interests and activities were more narrowly defined and were predominantly aimed
at securing advantages or concessions for themselves as distinct from the mass
of the African population. The undisputed leader of this group was Dr. Walter
Rubusana, who moved to East London during the late 1890s. In 1921, the
standing and influence of Rubusana and others (including R-H. Godlo and J.J. Vimbe)
was institutionalised with the creation of a Location Advisory Board. This body
became the formal and the only recognised channel between the municipality and
township opinion. The extent to which Rubusana and the others could exercise
this representative function was sharply constrained by popular suspicions and
resentment of.this elite. The Board members were elected, in any case, only by
the leaseholders in the Locations, and many of the migrant and casual labourers
living as lodgers would have had little sense of the clerics and clerks as their
spokesmen.
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The Vigilance Association, although also headed by educated men,
represented a broader social spectrum and (like its counterparts in rural
areas) tended to be more sensitive to popular issues. The Advisory Board
and Vigilance Association had a fluctuating relationship. At times, the
"Vigilance Association worked in loose conjunction with the Advisory Board,
in that the six elected Board members used to report back to the Association,
and receive a sort of mandate from it to put the people's views"; but on
other occasions they clashed. One commentator noted that in the 1920s it
became evident "that the personal interests of members elected to advisory
boards were often incompatible with those of the people as expressed through
the vigilance associations", and once the Vigilance Association actually
tried to unseat the representative on the Board. The Vigilance Association
executive was elected by leaseholders and holders of lodgers' permits; its
meetings "used to be crowded out by hundreds of participants" and the
Association was consequently more credibly "recognised as representing 'the
(8)people's views'." The scanty evidence available for the Association
suggests that it maintained fairly close links with its grassroots constituency;
that it represented independent Xhosa churches rather than mission-linked
churches; and that on occasions it threw its weight behind the agitation for
higher wages and at other times was concerned with rural issues like land and
livestock.. An informant told Mayer in the 1950s that the Association used to
function "exactly like an inkundla in the country, with the difference that not
(9)
only men could attend, but the old and young of both sexes".
As well as the Board and Association, there were also attempts to provide
political leadership in the black community by the (Cape) ANC, the ICU and
(after April 1929) the Independent ICU. A branch of the ICU was first
established in East London in 1922; but even then it was not the case that
"outside" organisers moved into the city to create a labour movement on a
tabula rasa. There was already a distinct pattern of worker militancy in
the town, centred - as in many colonial settings - in the harbour and rail
labour force, which the ICU inherited and tried to extend. In 1911 a strike
of dock-workers (followed by a wave of strikes in the city) won a wage increase
of sixpence per day. In 1918 steep cost of living increases triggered another
broadly based outbreak of labour unrest in East London which led the Town
Council and Chamber of Commerce to recommend all-round pay increases. The
East London Native. Employees Association of 1920 is the first recorded instance
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of a worker-based organisation in the town. It was active in another strike
by harbour workers in 1921, which was broken by the importation of workers
from Port Elizabeth and the surrounding coungryside. It is not clear
how active a presence the ICU branch maintained between 1923 and 1927. The
national conference was held in the city in 1924, but there is little other
evidence that the local body made much headway until after the spectacular
national expansion of the ICU in 1926 and 1927.
The rest of this essay will be largely concerned to chart the shifts that
took place between 1928 and 1931 in the discourse of the trade union organisers -
changes in their language and rhetoric, in what issues they emphasised and in
what interests they voiced. This is not to suggest that there was a consistent
and unchanging ideology in the movement before 192.8. The ICU in the 1920s
displayed a number of different ideological facets: the stress on union
organisation and strikes in the early twenties; the flirtation with Communism
and its subsequent repudiation; the involvement in rural areas and the adoption
of rural grievances. The ideological basis of the ICU was in a process of
constant reformulation as new localities, new interests, and new organisers
representing these, were caught up in the movement. This ideological fluidity
was a natural reflection of the diversity of its mass base, "the ill-defined
groups of dissidents characteristic of early industrialisation".
At the same time, there were a number of ideological continuities, basic
features of the aims and outlook of the movement, which - while they might be
modified by or mingled with other elements - remained central and intact. Through
an examination of speeches made by organisers of the East London branch of the
union it is possible to establish a clear set of preoccupations and prescriptions
for the period up to the formation of the IICU in April 1929. It is essential
to identify and analyse this ideological matrix in some detail, in order to
pinpoint subsequent departures and developments. Section 2, below, is devoted
to such an identification and analysis. Section 3 looks at the immediate shifts
in rhetoric and tactics that were displayed by the IICU between April and
December 1929. Section 4. is an account of the strike of 1930 mounted by the
IICU, while section 5 examines the aftermath of the strike and the way in which
i
the IICU responded to a range of popular ideological concerns, including specific
township grievances and rural issues. A concluding section 6 includes a discussion
of the.strains placed on the IICU by the shifts in tactics and ideology.
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(2) ICU IDEOLOGY IN EAST LONDON, JANUARY 1928 - APRIL 1929
The East London branch was fairly buoyant at the beginning of 1928,
having benefited from the surge in membership and popularity of the movement
at large. Local organisers held open air meetings almost every Sunday near
the dipping tanks in the East Bank Location. The most regular speakers
at these meetings were officials of the national ICU in the Eastern Cape -
Theo Lujiza, Mac Jabavu, and John Mzaza - and two members of the local branch
committee, Alfred Mnika and Joel Magade. The first-named trio were very much
in the mould of the respectable, petty bourgeoise trade union officials. Lujiza
served for a number of years on the Location Advisory Board; a white lawyer
wrote in 1927: "He is a peaceful, law-abiding native of temperate character
and I would be greatly surprised if anything he said or did stirred people
(12)
to unlawful actions." Jabavu was the second son of J.T. Jabavu and
was if anything even more self-consciously respectable than Lujiza. Mnika
came from East London and Magade from the Transkei; both men usually addressed
their audiences in Xhosa and also served as interpreters when Kadalie and others
spoke in English. In the first few months of 1928, the ICU meetings generally
attracted crowds of a few hundred people, climbing to 600 or more when Kadalie
spoke, when local men reported on national meetings, or when a particular episode
fanned indignation. After April 1928 and for the next twelve months, however,
attendances fell sharply and meetings seldom drew as many as one hundred listeners,
These attendance figures (see Table 2) are of some importance for our analysis;
for while they do not reflect the full range of the union's activities they
provide a rough index of the popular support and interest generated by the move-
ment in East London.
Falling attendances in mid-1928 were symptomatic of wider problems of the
ICU in South Africa. The expansionary surge of 1926/7 was halted and reversed;
feuds within the leadership tore the union apart; and four rival bodies all
claimed to be the true descendants of the ICU in its halcyon days. It was
in August 1928 that William Ballinger arrived in South Africa to act as
adviser to the ICU; his attempts to place the finances of the union on a new
footing accelerated the wrangles and splits. Indirectly, however, the fracturing
of the parent body helped rekindle local enthusiasm. More specifically, the
Independent ICU (the faction established in April 1929 and led by Kadalie himself)
made East London its de facto headquarters. Kadalie and Tyamzashe (a national
organiser originally from East London) were joined by the local activists, Mnika
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and Magade. The "Old ICU" (now closely associated with Ballinger) retained
an East London branch, led by Lujiza and Mzaza. It became apparent within
a couple of months that in East London at least the IICU was a more popular
vehicle than the Old ICU. It rapidly demonstrated an ability to draw
crowds of 400, 500 or 600 people, while the numbers attending Old. ICU
meetings dwindled to 60, 40 or fewer (on several occasions the turn-out
was so thin that the detective taking notes at the meeting could count heads
and report that twenty-two or sixteen men and women were present). The Old
ICU did manage to attract 600 people when Ballinger spoke in September 1929 -
but many in the audience were there to heckle; the meeting ended in a fracas
and Ballinger had to be escorted from the township by police.
(i) "Stick to your Union" - organisation and fund-raising:
Through the entire period for which ICU and IICU speeches in East London
are recorded, perhaps the most consistent theme was the preoccupation of
organisers with the need for organisational unity, loyalty, obedience and
the payment of subscriptions. Exhortations to join the union, to remain
faithful, and to fulfill financial obligations to it regularly punctuate the
transcripts of meetings. "You must have courage and stick to your Union",
adjured Mnika in the midst of a typical speech (19/2/28).* Kadalie made
the same point in his more flamboyant style: "Smuts and Hertzog would like to
shoot me, but my last words would be 'stick to your union'". (20|9|29)
The concern with organisational issues in a recently established union is
understandable, and expressed the difficulties faced by the movement. In
1928, organisers were trying to sustain interest in a flagging movement;
without the loyalty they insistently demanded the survival of their trade
union itself seemed to be at stake. The stress on unity also reflected the
challenge of trying to organise a highly heterogenous constituency: it
included industrial workers, casual labourers and unskilled workers, domestic
servants, and the urban unemployed; it spanned permanently urbanised men and
women as well as those moving between town and countryside. There were some
attempts to mobilise specific target groups of workers in 1928, but that was not
* All quotations from CA, 1/ELN, box 86 file c3 (1) and box 87 file c3 (2) (see
Note on sources) are identified in the body of the essay by the date of the
meeting being reported. Other sources are footnoted in the normal way.
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the main thrust of the ICU approach. Its activists were guided by a
conception of themselves as leaders of a mass movement rather than of an
industrially based trade union; the ICU represented "your salvation
therefore every man shouldbe a member" ( 28/7/29). Unity was not
simply a desirable goal but virtually the precondition on which the
promise of deliverance was based.
Financially, the ICU depended on membership fees (a joining fee of 2/6d
was followed by monthly dues of 6d) and on the income from ad hoc collections
taken at meetings- Though the union had a core of support in the city, its
membership in the twenties was not based on steady growth but on rapid rises
and falls. This meant that there was a constant pressure for new recruitment
simply to keep the branch solvent. Compounding this problem was the tendency
for members to join, pay for their tickets, but then let their subscription
lapse. Threats that the membership of defaulters would be cancelled did not
carry much weight while the union could deliver little in the way of concrete
benefits for its members. The ICU in East London operated under conditions
of chronic financial neediness. It constantly appealed for cash donations to
finance legal costs, journeys by the leaders, the entertainment of visiting
dignitaries, or to swell funds being raised in solidarity with campaigns
elsewhere. The hat was passed round at nearly every meeting.
For those on whom subscriptions or donations were being levied, the cash
payments had political as well as financial dimensions. Payment of a member-
ship subscription was a declaration of commitment and a legitimation of a
new source of authority and leadership. Equally, those who paid wanted to know
what returns were likely on their investment. This had two effects: it fed
into the "insurrectionary" approach of the ICU (the sweeping promises of imminent
deliverance) and it lent an edge to the frequent accusations of financial mis-
management or peculation brought by members against their leaders. These
tensions were frequently visible in ICU speeches. The organisers had to
persuade their hearers not only of the urgent need for money but also of the
probity of those who were collecting it. "ICU members must pay our subs"
urged Mnika,
because if we don't pay we cannot fight the law without
funds ... we always collect money to fight the Government ....
Try and pay your fees and don't think we want the money
for ourselves. The money is much needed to carry on the
good work that is being done all over the country on our
behalf, you here at present will benefit by it some day. (11/11/28)
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(ii) "To better your condition" - workers and wages:
The ICU were self-consciously trade unionists, but they seldom invoked
the language of class solidarity or class struggle, nor did they see their
goal in terms of worker control. Kadalie occasionally but atypically sought
to claim a place for the ICU within a working class internationalism: "Workers
throughout the world are forming themselves into bodies and taking as their
motto that employers must be controlled by workers." ( 21.1.30) T^ e
rarity of such expressions by ICU leaders cannot be ascribed solely to fears
that such radicalism would.invite governmental wrath. For one thing, there
is a consistent strand of reformism running through even those statements
which explicitly posed the struggle as one of workers against employers.
Moreover, the conflict was more frequently depicted as one of an oppressed
black nation - in which (as will be seen) a stronger current of radicalism
did flow.
More charaeteristic than demands for worker control was a defensive and
melioristic trade, union rhetoric. Audiences were urged in general terms to
"unite and be prepared to protect yourselves against the exploiters of labour"
or assured that their leaders' "chief object is to better the conditions of
every native in Africa". ( 4.3.28 and 3.2.29). But it was
cerainly not a political class struggle which was advocated as the passage
to victory for an African working class. In their more cautious moments (and
these were not infrequent) they explicitly divorced themselves from political
action. "The ICU does not intend to rebel against any government", said
Lujiza "but will approach the government to try and get ... a better wage
for the natives, and better conditions." (22/1/28) Magade assured his
audience that the union was "not against the government" but was "only
trying to get the employers of labour to better your conditions". (28/3/28)
The same speaker distanced himself from agitation against the pass laws,
arguing that "We cannot expect any better treatment by such wild sayings."
(15/4/28) Lujiza and Mzaza went even further, justifying pass laws as an
extension of controls imposed in traditional African societies by elders over
young men. (8.7.28).
Wage demands were frequently clothed in the language of respectability.
Minka insisted:
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We are not against any government, we are only out
to ask the various employers of native labour to pay the
natives a little more money for their labour, so that
they will be able to live better and clothe themselves
more respectable. (26/2/28)
Another speaker explained that the ICU was "not a home for thieves or drunkards
or people of bad conduct, but was trying "to make good men of the natives so
that they can be looked on as reliable men." (11/3/28) Again, it was explained
that the ICU was "going to agitate until we have better conditions and are paid
better wages so that we can live in a similar way to the white people." (9.6.29)
In pursuit of these better wages, the ICU leadership placed great hopes on
negotiations through the Wages Board established under the 1925 Wage Act to
investigate and implement minimum wages in particular cases. A successful
appeal by black workers in Bloemfontein, and the fact that the Board could be
approached by African workers1 organisations (although their status under the
Wage Act was unclear) encouraged these hopes. As Kadalie, expansively, put it:
"I like the Prime Minister for one good thing he has done, and that is appointing
a wage board." (24/6/28)
(iii)"To build a strong nation" - black nationalism and the ICU:
The concern for respectability was not solely indicative of a meliorist
and cautious trade union approach. It also encompassed a struggle for dignity
and a protest against the alienation of workers, especially when this alienation
had racist overtones. Speakers complained about the behaviour of white employers,
who used neither the Xhosa names nor even the given Christian names of their
employees, but called them simply "Jim, John, Jane or Annie" (15/12/29). The
sense of alienation was, however, translated by ICU speakers into a a call for
nation-building: this would give blacks - in an increasingly racially defined
system of oppression - the hope of dignity and collective self-respect.
Thus, disavowals of all but gradual reforms in the trade union sphere were accompanie
by promises of liberation and transformation in the political world. Mnika
expressed this forcefully in a passage linking the humanity of workers (an
argument against their alienation) with their identity as members of a black
nation:
Don't behave any longer as if you are constructed machines, •
but wake up and realise that you are human beings and that
you have feelings to other human beings, and always remember
the ICU is out to help you. This black nation of ours has to
be recognised as a nation; and the ICU will build you into a
nation if you will only stick to it. Your black brothers are
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working hard to organise you .... You natives must be
released from bondage and oppression, you must be treated
as human beings, not as machines, you must be faithful to
the organisation and pay your subscriptions .... The ICU
intend to reign all over Africa not in one little part.
(19/2/28)
The creation of a strong black nation meant the creation of unity across
divisions amongst blacks. ICU leaders often deplored the old "tribal"
divisions and called for the recognition of a single nationhood amongst
Xhosas, Zulus, BaSotho, and so on. Ultimately black unity offered greater
rewards than collaboration with whites: Mfengu and Gqunukwebe had once been
rewarded with land for helping the whites, but it was now being taken from
them - "It is no use trying to be the white man's good boy." (10/6/28) A
new nation would achieve new goals, united by blackness rather than divided
by tribal customs - and the ICU was the new means to this end. Black self-
consciousness and self-help was a strong component in the rhetoric of nation-
building. "We must be like Garvey", proclaimed Ilnika: despite imprisonment
"he still worked hard to better the conditions of his fellow black men."
(13.5.28) The ICU branch gave a sympathetic hearing to Elijah Dyantyi
in January 1929 when he proposed opening black cooperative stores and
boycotting European establishments:
The stores should sell all sorts of groceries and drapery
and would also buy your wool, skins and mealies. The whole
business would be worked by the [elected] committee ... young
native girls would be employed in the stores and would receive
a proper wage for their work. By starting with these stores you
would improve your brains and you would soon be recognised ... (27/1/29)
This rhetoric of self-improvement was of course not unique to the ICU; it
is strongly reminiscent of strains within the contemporary ANC and the
separatist church movement.
Black nation-building, it was frequently mentioned, was not a violent
course: "I do not mean fight with guns or sticks, but I mean fight by
constitutional methods" and "I told them straight away that the ICU had not
been formed to spill blood, but to build us into a nation" were typical
assurances. ( 12.2.1928 ) Other examples of successful nationalism
were cited. The English had been "living in caves and dressed in animal
skins" when the Romans found them and "were treated just as our forefathers
were a hundred years ago" - explained Lujiza - but the English had learned
(as Africans must now) that "blood is thicker than water". (8/7/28) Despite
the hostility often shown towards Afrikaners, the success of Hertzog and the
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National Party in agitating and rising to power was several times held up
as a model of national mobilisation, the ICU, in short, advocated a
gradualist and non-violent national struggle as a resistance to racial
oppression - which was seen as fundamental to their subordination.
Concomitant with black nationalism was a generalised hostility towards
whites, perceived collectively as oppressors of the black nation. Explicitly,
even those who professed to be "your white friends", warned Magade, were
your bitterest enemies, so please beware of them. The
white people do not like Kadalie because he is making
the AmaXhosa understand that they have been exploited for
years and years and oppressed by the whites ... (5/2/28)
Anti-white rhetoric was usually modified and guarded. There were frequent
attempts to differentiate between "good" whites (especially overseas) and
"bad" whites; English and Afrikaner whites were compared to the detriment
of the latter; and the ICU leadership disapproved of the pungently anti-white
language of the Wellington movement in 1928 and 1929. Instances of white
racism - like the sacking of the ICU office in Greytown, Natal, by local
vigilantes - were bitterly attacked; but even these tones were tempered
by fairly frequent expressions of trust in the rule of law and a "colour-blind"
court system.
Another way in which the ICU speakers sought to establish their nationalist
credentials was by making a sharp distinction between themselves and those
held to be collaborating with white oppressors. Considerable disdain was
reserved for "intellectuals": they were "like Judas"; they spent people's
money on lawyers; they could be.bought off. "If the ICU was for intellectuals",
said Kadalie, "it would be like many other past native organisations; it would
soon be defunct." ( 24.6.28). Bodies like the Transkeian General
Council ("whitemen and good boys") were dismissed as elitist. The ICU spokesmen
were at pains to deny their own elite status; Kadalie was "proud of being
leader of raw natives". (24/6/28) Whatever the basis in fact of this claim,
it is typical of ICU efforts to portray their movement and its relations with
popular elements as quite different from groups of elite leaders serving elite
organisations.
(iv) "God has sent Kadalie" - chiefs, rural issues, and Christianity
ICU leaders evinced rather ambiguous attitudes towards hereditary African
chiefs. It was around chiefs that particularist loyalties - cutting across
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nationalist aims - could coalesce, and chiefs were also regarded as
representative of rural backwardness. At the same time, it was a political
reality in rural areas that if chiefs were hostile to the ICU it would be
difficult to recruit their followers as members. So on the one hand there
were warnings against traditional authorities: "Your native chiefs will
not build you into a strong nation, but the ICU will" (12/2/28) and "They
are paid servants of government ... they are selling us to the white people".
(28.5.29). On the other hand, there was a warm welcome for any chief
who expressed interest in the tenets of the ICU and shared its national
approach. There were several such instances in 1928, and links were
established with senior Transkeian chiefs like Poto and Dalindyebo.
The ICU sallies into the Ciskei and Transkei in 1928 derived from
recent ICU experience in South Africa at large. The response to the union's
message in rural areas during 1926 and 1927 meant that it was impossible for
the leadership to consider the organisation of urban workers as their sole
(or even their primary) aim. The East London branch looked to rural self-help
schemes in Natal as a model, and Lujiza in particular favoured a scheme of
co-operative farm purchases. Bids could also be made from the countryside for
ICU support; Chief Mrweto of Peddie - involved in protracted resistance to
government land policies - made it clear that he was not a member of the move-
ment but that he had "come to East London to get assistance from my people to
fight the Government for a piece of ground". (18/11/28) But rural issues
remained largely separate from urban; the two were to become much more closely
intertwined during the after the IICU strike of 1930.
The attitude of the ICU leaders to churches and Christianity was another
defining feature of their overall position. The East London hinterland was
an area strongly influenced by Christian missions and by the development of
independent churches; the leaders themselves had all been exposed to mission
education. The bible was a frequent source of imagery: and particularly
striking was the use of religious idioms of unity, salvation and leadership.
The ICU should be built up like a new Jerusalem; Kadalie was a new David
"ordained by God to lead the African to a new Africa". Nineteenth century
Xhosa prophecies "that we should be a scattered tribe" had come true - "but
the ICU is going to bring us together again." ( 4.3.28). God, said
another speaker, had "sent Kadalie to us to deliver us from the oppression
in which we have lived all these years." (26.4.28)
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Apart from the political metaphors derived from the scriptures, the
stance of the ICU towards organised religion was ambivalent. Lujiza did
not "believe in church going, crying and weeping" - but he also acknowledged
that "Church laws will assist us to remember that blood is thicker than water."
( 8.7.28 ) Kadalie was sarcastic about the values and attainments
of the converted elite: "Umfundisi tells you that you won't go to heaven
unless you pay your church dues." In Alice he warned a missionary meeting
that if they continued to criticise the ICU they would find they had no church
members left. (24.6.28) Magade denounced the schisms within the
church as divisive, and feared parallel splits within the union. It is probably
accurate to sum up the position of the ICU leaders towards mission Christianity
as sceptical. But they were not yet wedded to the African separatist churches
(which were winning large numbers of converts from the urban and rural poor in the
1920s). They did not and possibly could not endorse Wellington Buthelezi's boast
that he would break down the white churches and schools; nor his claim that
Christ was not white and that blacks should have their own churches.
In the same way that the ICU did not use separatist Christian ideology
in appealing to its urban and rural constituencies at this stage, nor did it
take up popular local grievances. The reluctance of the leaders to take a
clear stand on issues like location permits and passes has been mentioned.
Another topic on which the ICU was virtually silent was domestic beer brewing.
The only references to beer in this period were couched as injunctions against
drunkeness {seen as a barrier to successful union organisation). Faced with
falling attendances at meetings in 1928, Magade blamed this on those who "roam
the location drinking Kaffir Beer". (4/3/28) The organisers' insensitivity
to beer brewing as a potential political issue was duplicated in their attitude
to women. Women could join the ICU, but were accommodated in a separate branch
and were viewed as tea makers and social organisers rather than as fully
involved union members. (20/5/28) Kadalie welcomed the support of women, but
as a source of pressure on their husbands rather than in their own right:
"If your husbands are not members of the ICU divorce them. Throw them over
for members" was his jovial advice. (4.6.28) When some East London
women left the ICU for the Wellington Movement's blend of radical Africanism
and separatist religion, Mzaza upbraided them in classically paternalist tones:
There is no reason why the women members should leave.
They were given a hall where they could hold meetings
and a secretary to whom they could make any complaint.
I don't know what more they want. (17/2/29)
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While women always attended ICU meetings, there was little consideration
or representation at this period of their particular interests.
The findings of this section may be briefly summarised. The ICU speeches
before April 1929 essentially voiced a broadly nationalist position. Its
trade union approach stressed the virtues of organisational unity and the
need for funds and was little concerned with class based political action.
Although there was an undercurrent of Africanism and anti-white rhetoric,
these were unusually qualified by acknowledgements of the benefits of "white"
civilisation and by protestations of the movement's moderation. Africanist
statements were characteristically couched in improving exhortations to
self-help and self-respect. Allowing for ambiguities and shades of emphasis
between different speakers, the leadership articulated the position of a petty
bourgeoisie making claims to leading a national struggle, to build a nation in
its own image. Popular township grievances made only fleeting appearances in
the rhetoric, and the leadership was not notably close to the demands of a mass
base in the East and West Bank locations. Nevertheless, the ICU ideology
contained the potential for more radical and popular departures. Kadalie was
jealous of his reputation as a firebrand; he projected himself as a popular
leader and had visions of a mass following. The ICU leadership perceived
themselves as different from the small coterie of "goodboys" who dominated
.formal township politics; by inference, their links with rank and file East
Londoners were also different. In the anti-white and anti-mission sentiments
lay the seeds of a more radical populist approach. There was considerable scope
for rapid ideological shifts, and, as the next section argues, these began to
occur almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Independent ICU in
April 1929.
(3) THE INDEPENDENT ICU, APRIL 1929 - JANUARY 1930
Almost immediately after the formation of an IICU branch (in the first
weeks of April 1929) there were perceptible changes in position and rhetoric.
This must be explained partly by changes in personnel. Mzaza, Jabavu and
Lujiza represented the more conservative elements before April 1929, and they
stayed with the Old ICU. Kadalie and other national organisers visited East
London during the first weeks of the new branch's life, but the local stalwarts
Mnika and Magade became even more prominent in the IICU. It is especially in the
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speeches and actions of these two men, and also in addresses by other local
activists (Tshingile, Vandala, Ntame and Mciza) now making their debuts on
the IICU platform that the new rhetorical positions are evident. At the
second meeting of the IICU Magade declared exuberantly "We are now agitators
like there are in Russia" ( 21.4.29): leaving aside the accuracy of his claim,
one can surely detect in it a sense of renewal and escape from the constraints
and infighting of the old ICU .
The very formation of the IICU branch instilled a new dynamism in meetings.
Kadalie's renown, self-confidence and bombastic speeches contributed an almost
palpable energy. The IICU could credibly portray itself as a new force, making
a fresh start. Also, while the old ICU must at times have felt like a very
distant outpost of the main organisation, the IICU's East London branch rapidly
became the main testing ground for the new body. This alone may have made links
between union organisers and the township inhabitants a more urgent matter, hence
making the former more sensitive to the interests of the latter. Between the
formation of the IICU branch and its launching of a strike (in mid-January 1930)
three areas can be identified where the shifts in the political position of the
leadership were most pronounced:
(i) the IICU's concern to articulate workers' grievances and to organise
amongst workers; (ii) the development of an overt and more radical
Africanism; and (iii) the increased importance of religious legitimation
and closer links with independent churches. These are discussed in this
section.
Ideological developments on three other fronts - township issues; rural
organisation; and the impact of aspects of popular folk culture (including
millenial beliefs) - can also be detected during this period. But their
impact was far greater after the 1930 strike, and they will be discussed
in sections 5 and 6 below.
(i) Workers,, wages, and the decision to strike:
As suggested, the IICU had both incentive and opportunity to focus on
specific local issues and to organise around these. The vitality of the new
movement was going to depend on its ability to win a large following in the
city which had effectively become its showcase; this in turn meant being
able to identify and to support popular demands. This position also had to
be staked out in competition with the Old ICU, which continued to hold
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regular meetings in East London, and whose speakers denounced the IICU
"renegades" with as much passion as the IICU used in attacking Old ICU
"sell-outs". Both bodies sought to establish themselves as the legitimate
organ of the East London townships and hinterland. In this competition,
Kadalie and the Independents were overwhelmingly successful.
At the outset, as they sought their footing, the IICU leaders agitated
over several issues which had only limited popular currency. Mnika tried
to establish their new identity by emphasising the farm purchase scheme, a
programme dear to the elements of the central leadership which followed
Kadalie into the IICU. To finance the purchases, the East London IICU called
for £1 donations from-individual members. It also sought cash to build a hall
for union meetings. These expensive projects continued to. feature in IICU
speeches throughout 1929, but increasingly in ways which indicated the
difficulties of raising such substantial sums. Kadalie's own visit in April
1929 did little to chart a new direction for the IICU: he was mainly concerned
to justify his stand over the fission in the union and to attack Ballinger. It
was the visit of the charismatic national leader Keable 'Mote (the "lion of the
north") in May/June 1929 which set the IICU on course for its spectacular
rise in popularity. Mote was a fiery speaker who had been an advocate of
direct action in the ICU before the split; he was, with Kadalie, one of the
first people charged under the "sedition" clause of the 1927 Native Administratic
Act. He also came to East London explicitly to organise. In a series of
rousing meetings, attended by between one and our hundred people, he promised
to organise the black races of this town I can assure
you that before I leave East London a good many Natives
will have joined the Independent ICU .... I want every man
and woman to join so that we can fight this lodgers permit
business .... We can also send petitions to the Government
in regard to the prohibitions of Kaffir Beer being brewed in
your homes, our women are daily being sent to gaol ... (26/5/29)
Quite apart from the general brio of his address, 'Mote's comparative
experience was important: he came from Bloemfontein, where permission
had been won to brew beer for domestic consumption, and (as the quoted
extract shows) he ranged over several township issues when speaking to
East Londoners.
Of equal importance, he took up the question of wages more vigorously
and more concretely than the ICU branch had done during the previous eighteen
months. Low wages and a generalised poverty were pervasive facts of township
life in 1929. The black population had bee swollen during the late twenties
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by men and women displaced by poverty from rural areas, and their presence
(14)
exacerbated a state of "chronic poverty and unemployment" in the
townships. Two fairly detailed efforts to draw up cost of living figures
for black families were undertaken in 1929, by the IICU and by the MOH.
A monthly domestic expenditure of, respectively, £7-13-7 and £5-1-6 was
arrived at by these two investigations; even on the lower figure (the MOH
acknowledged) the "actual monthly expenditure for the average family" exceeded
the average income. Average wages for labourers were between £4 and £5 per month;
female domestic servants earned between 25s. and 30s.. It was in the context
of a labour surplus and depressed incomes that 'Mote pressed his and the IICU's
campaign for higher wages in East London.
Starting with the premise that "all native workers of this country
are in need of increased wages", 'Mote blended a promise of .material gain,
nation-building and organisational unity: "I say the black races of South
Africa must unite and when we are properly united we shall be able to
demand a hearing and say what we require." He wrote letters to the South
African Railways, the City Council, and other leading employers cf black
labour in the city, seeking direct negotiations on wage levels. He left
East London in June (and was shortly to depart from the IICU itself) but his
initiatives were pursued by Magade and Mnika. Throughout July, August and
September 1929 IICU speeches were largely taken up with the issue of wages
and negotiations (directly with employers and also through the Wage Board)
by the union on behalf of workers. These negotiations produced no concrete
results, and failed to satisfy rank and file expectations. Pressure from below
was being exerted - Mnika mentioned that members were complaining "that we do
not force the Europeans to increase your wages" - and resisted: he added that
"we cannot hurry in such a matter; it takes time to find out how demands are
going to be received." (21/7/29)
But what if the demands were not received? By the end of July, the ICU
organisers showed signs of abandoning their previous caution. Magade, for
the first time, warned of possible strike action "if the European employers
do not listen to us". ( 14.7.29) Increasingly, the notion of strike
action and - by corollary - of the power of organised workers began to surface
in IICU speeches. By September, Mnika was encouraging his hearers with the
argument that even domestic servants, if united, could wield economic power:
The IICU is going to work hard to get the native wages increase.
We are going to ask every European who employs native labour to
increase the native wage, and if not they will find one morning
that he will not have his native servant to light his fire, cook
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his breakfast, brush his shoes, clean his garden, clean
his motor car or groom his horse. The European Mrs. will
have to do the washing and cooking and all her house work
if she is not prepared to pay the native servant girl
sufficient wages. (1/9/29)
The readiness to confront employers and to offer more radical leadership to
workers arose partly out of local conditions, but also partly out of the
competition with the Old ICU . The Old ICU had lost the battle to attract
larger crowds, but was also pushing a policy of wage negotiations - and even
arguing that their greater respectability gave them an edge in seeking
negotiations: "Mnika is not a man who can go and interview the Wages
Board." (8.9.29) One w a v ^or t n e IICU to distinguish its approach to
wages from that of the Old ICU was to look beyond cautious and bureacratic
approaches to the Wage Board and the Rail authorities, and to entertain the
notion of strike action. Kadalie returned to East London in September 1929, and
worker claims took on a more precise definition: the IICU wanted an increase
for rail and dock workers from about 3/6d per day to 6/6d (the old ICU was
bargaining for 4/6d). Kadalie's rhetoric waxed even more belligerent: "we
are not afraid", he told his audience. "Hertzog hates me and I hate him like
hell, the bugger. I am a bad native and I will remain a bad native .... they
call me an agitator and I will remain, an agitator." (20/9/29)
It was the breakdown of negotiations with the Railways and Harbour
management, and their denial that their employees came under the jurisdiction
of the Wage Board, that polarised the situation. By December, Magade and
Mnika were concentrating on organising and recruiting amongst this key group
of workers. They were encouraged in their activities by a success in winning
higher wages for the employees in some small factories: In early January,
the IICU held its first annual conference in East London. Experienced
organisers from around the country moved into the city - including Robert
Kadalie, Maduna, Sijadu and others - and they addressed meetings in East
Bank Location. The conjuncture of this conference and the possibility of
a strike (promised by Kadalie if the rail and dock increases could not be
won by bargaining) attracted very large crowds to IICU meetings: speakers
were addressing gatherings of up to 1500 people in early and mid-January.
The extra organisational weight provided by the visitors, coupled with
the heightened expectations of the workers, lent a distinctly more aggressive
mood amongst local leaders. "We have been too loyal" declared one speaker;
"I am the son of a warrior", claimed another. (8.1.30). Kadalie
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characteristically announced his intention "to fight the buggers" and "go
the whole damn hog". (16/1/30) A feature of the rhetoric of January 1930
was that the theme of violence surfaced in various ways. There was a
persistent recitation of the history of violence visited on the Xhosa and
of the everyday experience of the callous brutality of inter-racial contacts.
This was a vocabulary some way removed from the passivity and caution of a
year earlier; but it was only in metaphorical flights that violent action
was ever proposed, or the vengeance of state power overlooked. The imagery
of violence was more than counterbalanced by a recurrent emphasis on non-
violent tactics, by an insistence that "we fight peacefully". Outgunned
as African workers were, there was an objective need to maintain united and
non-violent action at times of confrontation, and there was a realism about
the state's monopoly of the instruments of violence: "the others has
aeroplanes and guns". Unity was to be their weapon.
On January 12th 1930, Kadalie issued an ultimatum to harbour and rail
employers. There could have been little expectation of a positive response,
particularly within the 48 hours allowed by the IICU. On 15th January,
buoyed with recollections of previous victories - particularly relevant was
the strike by Cape Town dockers in 1919 - Kadalie called the black employees
of the South African Railways and Harbours out on strike. The events of the
strike, and its aftermath, are explored in section 4.
(ii) Africanism takes hold:
If the IICU's sudden rise in mass support at the end of 1929 and the
beginning of 1930 was largely due to the union's willingness to engage in
militant action on wages, nevertheless the popularity had other ideological
foundations as well. Its adoption, well before the stress on wages or talk
of a strike, of a more radical Africanist position laid the groundwork for
its mass appeal and its legitimation at grass roots level. The "new"
Africanism grew out of but went well beyond the ambiguous anti-white strands
of its discourse noted for 1928 and early 1929.
In the weeks following the ICU split, one of the ways in which the
Independents could distinguish themselves from the old guard was to attack
the latter's links with Sallinger. Ballinger was castigated, essentially, as
a white man muscling in on an African organisation: and the attack on him
rapidly became more generalised, giving a heightened place and a new edge to
the anti-white and exclusivist/Africanist tones of the IICU. Kadalie set
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the tone in his first address in the city after the formation of the IICU.
He recounted the details of his row with Ballinger and mentioned that
Ballinger had invited him onto the Joint Council in Johannesburg - nI
refused as natives cannot join any union with Europeans." (14/4/29) Mnika
and Magade followed suit at the very next meeting; they spoke for a new
ICU which "is not going to be the same as the Old ICU. We are not going to
be misled by a white man." The lines were firmly drawn. Lujiza and his
colleagues were said to have "betrayed Kadalie and... handed him over to a
white man" and Ballinger was "the enemy of our people". (21.4.29) Magade
followed his self-depiction as a Russian agitator by averring: "We believe
more in Kadalie than we shall ever believe in a white man." (21/4/29) A
fortnight later, Barney Vandala's warning against white perfidy was inter-
woven with religious prophecies and a call to nation-building:
I want to encourage you to build yourselves into a nation.
Do not take any notice of what the anti ICU people tell
you, they are your enemies. God has sent Kadalie to
us to uplift the black people. The anti ICU people forgot
what was said by God, that he will send a Captain from the
north to deliver his relations from darkness in the South.
I warn you not to listen to what the white people tell you,
they will put you against Kadalie but do not listen to them.
Kadalie ... is the man we have to listen to. Kadalie is
working for the freedom of the black races, and we black
people must help him. (5/5/29)
During the second half of 1929, suspicions of and hostility towards
whites echoed constantly in IICU speeches, and this rhetoric remained a
feature of IICU ideology throughout the period examined in this essay. Part
of the heightened racial consciousness was undoubtedly a response to political
developments in Pretoria and elsewhere. The 1929 "Black Peril" election, the
threat posed to Africans by another Kertzog government, and violent police
tactics in Durban were all part of the backdrop to events in East London. A
number of other, political movements amongst blacks at this time evinced
similarly Africanist positions, ranging from the rural Wellington movement
to the Garveyism of Thaele and other ANC leaders. In the IICU case the message
of Africanism was elaborated, its content developed. The call for black self-
sufficiency (already noted for the pre-1929 period) was extended. Mnika not only
advised that blacks establish their own shops.("support the shops run by natives,
have your boots repaired by native shoemakers") but also added "I would suggest
to you not to deal at European shops". (30/6/29) Six months later, during the
IICU strike, white shops were indeed boycotted. There was increased advocacy
of action in separate spheres of operation: whites had their own nation and
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their own union, it was argued, and blacks should build theirs. This could
even lead to an acceptance of the philosophy behind segregation, while hotly
disputing its terms: "There is one thing I like about General Hertzog", said
Magade, "he wants the natives to one side and the Europeans on the other side,
not to mix with one another", although in the same breath he attacked Hertzog
for wanting Europeans to have "all the land". (23/6/29) Withdrawing from
contact with whites implied closer links with other blacks: links with
Garveyism, with American blacks, with the United Negro Improvement Association
and with Coloureds and Indians in South Africa were all floated at various times.
The struggle for independence in India became a frequence reference point and
analogy.
IICU speakers in 1929 recalled dispossession at the hands of whites as a
crucial element in national oppression, reinterpreting the history of conquest
in a more radical way than hitherto. Reminders that "all the land of Africa
belonged to our forefathers, it was taken from them" flowed easily into claims
for the exclusive reoccupation of that land by blacks. Vividly, a speaker from
Springs in the Transvaal drew a political lesson from his visit to the seaside city:
When the white man came to our country we gave them everything,
whereas we should rather have killed them or died in endeavouring
to do so ... we have learnt enough now, it is time that we were
left to govern ourselves. Look at the sea and you will see
thousands of white girls bathing, but very few natives will be
seen which goes to show that the whiteman belongs to the sea and
they should be driven there. ( 6.1.30)
Ideas about nation-building now went beyond the concept of a united black
nation and embraced that of a liberated black nation. The IICU's promise of
building "a free black nation" became its quintessential slogan, while the
phrase is not recorded in the speeches made before April 1929. When black unity
was urged, it was frequently interpreted in sweeping and (in the South African
context) politically challenging fashion. Black unity was extended beyond pan-
tribalism to mean "all other non-European races". Africans were
advised by Sigadu to stop asking God to save King George. They should "pray to
God to save your native chiefs. Do as the Indians did, they lifted their own
flag and elected their own king." (5/1/30) Whereas references to the rise of
European civilisation had in 1928 usually been admiring, they were now derisive.
"They say it took them 2000 years to reach their present state of civilisation",
commented Maduna - "which is only what we can expect from such blockheads!" (8/1/30)
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Another speaker, Mkwambi, thanked the whites for what they had taught;
but added that Africans now had their own teachers. Kadaiie and the IICU
were consolidating a lesson of their own. They taught that whites were
oppressors.
(iii)Independent Christianity
The scriptures remained a rich source of images of oppression and
deliverance, but there are signs in 1929 of a marked switch in attitudes
towards churches and religion. Some IICU leaders maintained a sceptical
distance from churches of all kinds. But especially among new local leaders
on IICU platforms the mounting Africanist rhetoric was accompanied by a new
level of interest in and support for an African Christianity. This could
in some instances lead to involvement in separatist churches. It is clear
that the Independent ICU came increasingly to accept that it could not afford
to alienate these churches, and there was an overlap of membership in
independent sects and independent union.
The role of God as a higher authority from whom rights could be derived
was emphasised, especially as there remained no other legitimate sources of
authority. Explicitly, IICU leaders announced that they no longer looked to
Britain for justice or retribution, and regretted African support for the
Imperial war effort. "God", a local speaker averred, "is the only one who
will release us from the bondage of the Europeans." The logic of
this was followed through: "if we want to build ourselves into a free nation
we must serve God", and "he will help us with our organisation." (28/4/29)
Mnika added that he did not even mind being accused of holding "church services".
The close proximity thus claimed of the deity and the IICU was personified in
Kadaiie. Kadaiie had often been compared with biblical liberators (a "black
Moses") and described as having been sent by God to East London; it seems
however to have been his brother Robert who first declared that "Clements
Kadaiie is the son of Jesus Christ". (6.1.30)
God's agency on behalf of the IICU was necessarily mediated through churches
but not through all churches. The frequent references to religious legitimation
as a basis for national liberation were linked to criticisms of white, mission
churches and the call for a new black church. The cry "Do away with these
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European ministers" (5/1/30) was one half of this message; the century-old
tradition of Xhosa independent Christianity was the other. Ntsikana,
especially, was adopted as the prophet of Xhosa religious separatism. His
prophecies had been directly concerned with the arrival of Europeans and
could now be used as rallying calls to black solidarity. "Our prophet
Ntsikana told our forefathers not to follow the customs of the white man",
remembered one speaker; while another elaborated:
The prophet Ntsikana said under Ndoda mountain 'There is a
nation who comes from overseas; they bring you a round button
with no holes in it arid a bible book. Don't accept the button
[money] for as soon as you take it you will be scattered like
a flock of sheep and lose your nation. You must take the bible
for it bears all the teachings of God1. (22/6/30)
Kadalie was portrayed as the inheritor of Ntsikana's mantle (9/6/30) and
he found it easy to turn religious imagery to immediate relevance. Ke was
happy to accept the label "agitator" for himself; moreover, "Jesus Christ
and Moses were agitators because they wanted people to do God's will".
( ) The rhetoric of separatist Christianity reached its zenith
during January 1930: "There would be a new reformation, a new god, and new
religion. 1930 was going to be the black man's Reformation." ( 6.1.30)
During the first phase of the strike, in January 1930 (see section 3 below)
when mass meetings were being held almost daily, the tide of separatist
religious imagery ebbed sharply. But it was soon to flow strongly again. The
links established with independent churches now found organisational form.
When Kadalie and his strike committee were, arrested at the end of January, the
leadership of meetings fell largely on the shoulders of one Reverend Nonkonyane,
minister of an independent church. His ambiguous role in the division between
the original strike committee and the more militant rank and file committee is
detailed in section 3.
After the strike, through 1930 and beyond, this attachment to Christian
separatism remained a constant theme of IICU rhetoric, indissolubly bound up
with the language of black nationalism. Speakers repeatedly legitimised African
claims to land as derived from an African God; the new African native was blessed
by the same deity; an African God (and a black Jesus) were associated with the
national struggle; and black political leaders were identified with biblical
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liberators. As a white policeman summed it up, "The leaders are trying to
show the natives that" although they have not got the means or implements of
warfare like the Europeans, yet with the help of God they can master them."
( 29.6.36)--171 It was therefore necessary to have separate and direct access
to God: "There are twelve gates and twelve telephones in Heaven", insisted
a speaker, "and the Natives have their own gates and telephones." (24/11/29)
This need carried an organisational logic: it pushed the IICU into closer
co-operation with independent African churches.
Moreover, the links with separatist churches provided a recruiting device
for the IICU, notably of women members, who were correctly regarded as
providing the bulk of independent church congregations. The IICU leadership
was generally content to work with independent ministers who were actually
drafted onto the IICU committee; but there was also some talk of founding
their own IICU church. The earliest references to this project, by Kadalie,
were in extremely instrumental terms. Concerned that the state might outlaw
the IICU as a political and trade union movement, Kadalie suggested that he
might reconstitute it as a church, which would be less vulnerable. But this
tactical formulation was superseded by an altogether more evangelical project.
The reality of popular backing for the separatist church movement, the experience
of politicised prayer meetings, and the withdrawal by the end of 1930 of some
African ministers from their earlier close associations with the IICU all pointed
in a similar direction. Mnika, in particular, started towards the end of 1930
to resuscitate the idea of an IICU church. He called on ministers and teachers
to join the trade union to form "our own IICU churches and schools". (28.9.30)
Trade unionism and the independent church could be fused; "I don't mean that you
should not go to churches. I mean that we should form our own church, and all of
us must carry the [IICU] yellow tickets." (31.10.30)•• No formal establishment
of an IICU church appears to have taken place, although the well-attended
prayer meetings held under IICU auspices might be viewed as a partial achieve-
ment of that end. The parallels between rural separatist ideology discussed in
previous chapters and this politicised religious separatism in an urban township
are substantial.
(4) STRIKE AND AFTERMATH - JANUARY - JUNE 1930
The 1930 strike mounted by the IICU in East London has been dismissively
described by Wickins: it
can only be regarded as a failure. Though perhaps for
a day or two as much as eighty per cent of the Black
labour force of the city stayed away from work ...
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the stoppage was short-lived and partial .... [The strike]
had been ill-conceived and hastily executed without
preparation. (16)
In common with other accounts of the strike, Wickins assumed that the strike
effectively came to an end with the arrest of Kadalie and the strike committee
eleven days after it began; that when (January 28th) Kadalie "sent orders to
the strikers to return to work ... they did so". This fails to recognise
some of the most interesting features of the strike: in particular, the breach
between the strike committee leadership and the rank and file; the prolongation
of their stoppage by some strikers for six months; the social composition of the
strikers; and the significance of the support forthcoming from women domestic
(18)
servants. (This last point was noted by Monica Hunter. ) wickins1
description of the strike is certainly at variance with one penned by the
magistrate of East London in his confidential report to the Holloway (Native
Economic) Commission in 1931: he spoke of a strike "which lasted nearly six
months and involved some thousands of natives" and which saw "a large number of
(19)
men and women out of work and penniless".
The strike began on January 16th, with the expiry of the ultimatum to the
SARH. The action was launched amidst a flurry of mass meetings and with a welter
of rhetoric. Some of this - understandably - was confused and self-contradictory;
asservations of radicalism and accents of fervour ("If you are prepared to die
sing 'Onward Christian Soldiers'") were common, although they sat oddly along-
side injunctions to caution and orderliness. These latter predominated in the
language and tactics of the leaders. There was a pronounced emphasis on discipline
and.obedience to the leadership in speeches made at the strike's outset. Kadalie
told them that he was going to be General. I have made
many strikes in this country, we have got to be orderly,
not to walk about the streets, you must stay in the
locations ... I want to make it clear to you that we
are not going to fight with sticks, the others has
aeroplanes and guns. (12.1.30)
A few days later he returned to the theme:
We are the leaders, we are your Generals ... We are
going to form our own little Government, employ our
own police to do the picketing ... There will be no
drink because we cannot control you when you are
drunk. ( 13.1.30 )
Peter Mkwanbi urged his listeners "to remember that the strike organisation is
like a train, it only has one head and I want you to listen to the Strike
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Committee, remember we are fighting with our brains and not sticks." (15.1.30)
The "Rules for Strikers" issued by the Strike Committee (which consisted of
Kadalie, Mnika, Magade, Tyamzashe, Maduna, Mkwambi and Mqayi) began with
prohibitions against the carrying of sticks or "indulging in intoxicating
liquors". They also called on strikers to attend mass meetings, to
contribute 2/6d per head to a strike fund, and to other workers to "stand
by in case they are called upon for sympathetic action".
Sympathetic action was not long in coming. The stoppage by dock and
railway workers obviously excited a great deal of solidarity in the town-
ships; two, three, and four thousand people were attending the meetings
in support of the action. At the same time, the strike was vulnerable to
the replacement of workers on strike by unemployed men desperate for windfall
wages; while the shortage of funds and food for strikers also served to push
the pace of the organisers towards more militant action. This forced the
tactics of the Strike Committee down two particular paths. First, it made
picketing - which took the form of trying to "seal up" the locations, so as
to prevent men from leaving in search of work. - a high tactical priority; and
secondly, it led to the broadening out of the strike into a general stoppage,
calling on all black workers in East London to come out. By the third day of
the strike Kadalie announced that the Committee had decided "to lay the position
before the women of the location": in doing so, he was enlisting the support of
a group of workers who were to prove among the most determined of the strikers.
On the following day, a general strike was announced. Four days into the
general strike, a crowd of 4000 assembled, including a "commando" of about a
thousand men, described by the police as "marching in sections of fours". The
leaders made a series of militant speeches; . Kadalie in particular using strong
language and a tone of generalised aggression:
In plain language, if they want to fight this bloody
government must tell us. Let them tell us a certain
date and we will fight them on that date .... It is only
a question for me to light the match and you will see the
whole country ablaze ... How I feel about these Forces
in the location is that if I was in Nyasaland I would have
murdered some of these white buggers. If I had the Askaris
with me they would never come into the location ... Talk
about law and order; I say damn law and order. (22/1/30)
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The next day was a Sunday. Kadalie and the entire Strike Committee
were invited to a private negotiating session with Major Lister, District
Commandant of the South African Police. Upon arrival in his office, they
were surrounded by armed policemen, arrested, and charged on the morning
of the next day with incitement to public violence. On January 28th
Kadalie and his colleagues made a court appearance, and a letter from
them was read to the large crowd gathered outside. It said that the Strike
Committee had decided that the stoppage must be called off, and that all
workers must return to their posts: "You must go back to work immediately
and earn money to subscribe to our defence." The Daily Dispatch reporter
noted that this message was not well received by many in the crowd of 3,500.
On the next day Alex Fifana and John Mciza wrote on behalf of a "Rank and
File Committee" refusing Kadalie1s advice: "We shall not return to work
until our employers comply with our demands."
This breach between the original Strike Committee and the more militant
rank and file committee persisted in the months that followed. Unfortunately,
little evidence is available for this phase of the strike - there is a
frustrating break in the sequence of police reports - but what does exist may
be summarised. In the absence of Kadalie, Mnika, Magade,. and the rest of the
Strike Commitee, the mass meetings took on a different tone and shape. Very
large crowds attended; passions were easily aroused; but the diction was
transformed. Instead of the organisers' calls for discipline or Kadalie1s
braggadocio, the main message now came from Rev. Nonkonyane. This message
was deeply ambiguous. On the one hand, his speeches seemed designed to
maintain mobilisation. In his report of the meetings of 1st and 2nd February,
Det.-Sgt. Mandy had called them "purely religious gatherings", but on 4th
February he made this comment:
The meeting was conducted on purely religious lines, the
speakers reading and quoting relative [sic] passages from
the bible .... Some of these passages though couched in
biblical terms and quotations have practically the same meaning
as conveyed by the inflammatory speeches of Kadalie and his
strike committee. These passages have a double meaning. There
appears to be an undercurrent going on amongst the natives
which is being kept a secret.
On the other hand, Nonkonyane attempted to defuse the tensions created
by rank and file efforts to continue the strike and to attack scabbing workers.
He toldMandy that "these people are getting out of control. I have been
holding the reins tightly long enough", and warned that unless Kadalie were
released "I won't be able to control them any longer." (10.2.30) On two
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resented. Once the strike began, more stringent application of the regulations
governing these permits was one of the tactics favoured by the municipality and
the police, and there were explicit warnings that "any contraventions would be
dealt with and the existing laws enforced". (13/2/30)
This led to ever more desperate attempts to gain the permits by unemployed
inhabitants. A municipal officer described the pressures being imposed on the
clerks issuing the location permits:
The native clerks pointed out that it was difficult to
sort out the bona fide applicants because all the loafers,
hooligans, kaffir beer traders, etc., had joined the ranks
( * of the strikers, and the strikers claimed equal treatment
for them. (21)
On 21st February, ten men and two women were arrested, charged with living in
the Location without permits, and fined 10/- each: unable to pay their fines,
they were sentenced to gaol instead. All twelve of those arrested were
apparently workers on strike, and the popular protest that ensued sought to
establish their identity as striking workers and therefore as legitimate
township inhabitants. A crowd of about 3000 Africans assembled just before midday
outside the East London magistrate's court. A delegation representing the crowd
said that they were demonstrating on behalf of the arrested strikers and that "if
the strikers were to be arrested [they would] give themselves up in a body."
They then successfully negotiated the release of the twelve, upon payment of
the fines by popular collection. The episode prompted fears amongst the
authorities that the (original) Strike Committee "did not appear to have sufficient
hold over the rank and file and the unruly element might get the upper hand."
There was, in the Location that night an air of excitement: "a section of the
strikers jubilating, stating that the discharge of the prisoners was a victory
for strikers". •* (Police report, 23.2.30)
It is impossible to establish in any detail the composition of the crowds
who supported the Rank and File committee, who marched on the courthouse, and
who - in dwindling numbers - remained on strike until mid-1930. (Most of the
. strikers - those who could find re-employment - straggled back to work by May;
the last reference to "bitter-enders" is on June 16th.) There are a number of
indications that they included many women, and that they attracted a high
proportion of casual labourers, marginally employed and lumpen elements. Police
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said that there were numbers of "habitual unemployed and kwedines" at
meetings in February. These meetings were not as highly organised as the
regular weekly IICU occasions; as a report of 27 February put it:
There appears to be a more or less continuous gathering
of natives on the football ground, and it is stated that
the atmosphere is cloudy with impending trouble. Scrub
women and casual labourers, at work during the day, join
the gathering in the evenings and appear to support the
non-workers.22
Not only washerwomen, but other female workers too, played an important part
in sustaining the strike after it had been called off by Kadalie. This theme
is developed in the next section.
After preliminary hearings in East London, Kadalie and the eight members
of the Strike Committee were taken for trial to Grahamstown: according to
Kadalie in later years because "the authorities at East London did not trust
the local Africans, as they might make an attempt to rescue us from gaol by
force." The trial at the Supreme Court in Grahamstown lasted a month
and concluded with "Not Guilty" verdicts on each of 115 charges and a conviction
(with £25 fine) on one count for Kadalie. On 24th May, Kadalie and his co-accused
returned triumphantly to East London and held a meeting of about 1500 men and
women. "My oratory ... was in jubilant vein", Kadalie subsequently recalled -
and much of it consisted in denunciation of Detective-Sergeant Mandy and his
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commanding officer. Captain Lloyd-Lister. Despite a noisy welcome, Kadalie
and the strike committee did not return to an uncomplicated approval by the
location inhabitants. Kadalie1s advice to the strikers to return to work had
not been a popular one, and the success of the Rank and File committee in
mobilising support and sustaining strike action for several months meant that
the original leadership was going to have to compete with a new layer of
activists for the support of the workers. Even after Kadalie reported - to a
crowd of between 4000 and 5000 people - that he had "already been sitting in
conference with the Rank and File committee and we are engaged with the points
in dispute", Mandy1s opinion was that for the "hot heads" it was "no compensation
for them to now be told by Kadalie to go back to work" and he believed that the
Rank and File committee would "not receive Kadalie's suggestion too favourably
should he announce his intention of abandoning the strike." By May 29th, Kadalie
announced that "the small differences between you which were bound to occur when
your leaders were in gaol" had that day "been happily settled".
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The happy settlement was not complete: rancour against the original
Strike Committee bubbled over at the end of the very meeting at which Kadalie
announced the restoration of amity ("At this juncture the women folk jumped
up as in one body and all commenced to shout at the top of their voices, from
what I could gather [wrote MandyJ they were protesting against Madade ...")
and was to resurface again and again in the months that followed. Nevertheless,
the leadership was able to reassert its authority. But in order to lead, they
had to learn to follow: they had to change their tactics and embrace new"
issues. Defeated in their struggle to improve conditions at the workplace,
they found themselves having to be much more vitally concerned with issues of
the dwelling-place; the arena of conflict had been pushed into the township.
In the same way that new issues and interests were reflected in the rhetoric
and ideology of the IICU after its formation, the speeches of the IICU leaders
from mid-1930 graphically reflected the new context in which the union organisers
found themselves.
(5) MAY 1930 - 1932: THE IICU AS THE VOICE OF THE TOWNSHIP
One of the grievances that came to occupy a central position in the IICU
discourse was that of beer brewing. This was pre-eminently a women's interest,
and demonstrates the extent to which women were not shaping popular mass action
in" the townships. A second major change was a rediscovery by the East London
IICU of the countryside. The 1930 strike pushed organisers into rural areas in
search of support and resources; there they became caught up in a range of
popular rural movements. This section of the paper examines both these aspects
of political pressures "from below", and argues that these issues were
incorporated into IICU thinking and rhetoric as they tried to represent and to
lead a popular movement far broader than they had headed in East London prior
to the strike.
i) Women as wives, workers, and brewers:
Throughout the years covered in this essay, women remained peripheral to
the IICU organisation itself; there were no women.on the union staff, no
regular women speakers at the mass meetings, no women on the strike committee
(or on the rank.iand file strike committee ). Nevertheless, as the previous
section has indicated, during the first half of 1930 issues affecting women
were placed on the IICU agenda. The Union leaders tended to associate certain
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issues with women and to assign particular roles to women. The roles
singled out, and the issues attached to them, may be summarised as follows:
(i) Women as wives: in which role they might be called on to back their
men-folk or even to serve as "domestic pickets"; they also carried
out certain tasks regarded as women's work - such as tea-making,
organising social functions, making IICU badges, etc.
(ii) Women as workers: in which role they were for the most part already
in gender-defined jobs (domestic service, cleaning, laundry work).
(iii)Women as brewers: women engaged in a range of "informal sector"
activities (hawking goods, repairing clothes, baking bread without
a licence, etc.) of which the most important was the brewing of beer
to supplement family income, or even as the main means of income for
some women.
(iv) Women as landladies: There was very little municipal housing in the
Locations at this period, and about 90 per cent of all dwellings were
privately owned. Many women lived by taking in lodgers (either in
houses which they owned, or more commonly in buildings which they
rented and then sub-let).
When the strike began in January 1930, Kadalie was swift to appreciate
the contribution that women might make, initially in their capacity as wives.
He appealed to women to use their domestic power in helping to secure support
for the strike, urging them "to be the pickets in their own homes ... [to]
stop their husbands and their sweethearts from going to work. Should he be
a coward and go to work you must refuse to cook food." ( 18.1.30 ) Women
were also called on to provide support for striking male workers in the preparation
of food for them and their families, and Kadalie also asked them to be generous
("show the African spirit") to lodgers who could not afford to pay rent while
the strike was on. The extent to which, during the first days of the strike,
women were viewed essentially as wives is evidenced by the ban imposed by union
organisers on women receiving the food rations distributed to strikers. (The
rationale for this move was the leaders' belief that rations might be taken
by women whose husbands were still at work.)
If it was as.wives that they were perceived, it was as workers that the
women intervened most forcefully to shape the direction and content of the
strike. Their militancy was made patent early in the course of the action.
The first extension of the rail and dock workers stoppage into what became
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a general strike was through the mobilisation of women workers, mainly
domestic servants. At a meeting "attended by several thousand women"
(according to the Daily Dispatch, 20/1/30), it was decided that servants
would refuse to work after the weekend. It was at a further meeting on
the same day that the strike was redefined as a general strike. Two days
later a strike leader commented that "The girls have been more loyal to our
cause than the men", and he cited admiringly the instance of a woman who had
climbed through a window to join the strike after the doors were locked to.
prevent her leaving (22/1/30) and there was also a commendation for the six
women who "went to Dean's Hotel and pulled the women out of work there." (24/1/30)
A month later a cook (named in the newspaper report only as Lizzie) was fined
£1 or 14 days for "intimidating other girls from entering [her employer's]
employment": defiantly, she informed the magistrate that the strike was not over
as far as women servants were concerned and that a large number were still
(25 )
refusing to work.
This mobilisation of women as workers is a distinctive feature of the East
London strike. Most of them worked in highly individualised capacities, as
domestic servants, as laundry women, cleaners, and unskilled assistants in
hotels, shops and offices. They were at the bottom of the wages ladder. In
the months preceding the strike, little had been done to incorporate them into
the mass movement, and the leadership does not appear to have taken up their
case in any of its approaches to employers or Wages Board. But by the second
week of the strike, women's wage demands were being articulated as a specific
plank in the IICU platform. The call was for "domestic workers to receive a
minimum wage of £3 (or about double what they were receiving at the time) -
and "washerwomen 5/- per washing from one to twelve articles, twelve and over
to be paid for proportionately". This demand became coupled to that of 6/6d
per day for male workers as a long term union objective. There was specific
recognition that labour done by women for wages entailed hard and unattractive
work: "a washerwoman has a lot of dirty washing, some clothes full of excreta,
and that dirty work only for two shillings a day."( 9.6.30) This strongly
suggests that women's demands - whether through their separate IICU committee,
through their numerous presence at mass meetings, or through other associated
activities, such as the church and prayer meetings held under IICU auspices -
were successfully pressed from below into the discourse of the IICU.
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After the first fortnight of intensive strike action, and after Kadalie's
arrest and his call for a return to work, women workers gained a new prominence.
Throughout the period February-May 1930, when rank and file workers attempted to
prolong the strike, women were doubly engaged in this rearguard action. Not only
were a number of those who disobeyed the injunction to return to work women
workers, but women were also conspicuous by their presence at meetings. Whether
individual women returned to work or not, the strike had the effect of increasingly
financial and social pressures on location women as a group. The strike .- in its
initial form as well as in the rearguard action - threw additional people out of
work, and increased the strain on domestic budgets. It was women who had to
confront most immediately the problems of reduced income and food supply. (Actual
hunger played a real part in the progress of the strike- A great deal of energy
went into attempts to secure gifts of oxen and other foodstuffs from rural
supporters; women at prayer meetings prayed for food; and by mid-February
Mandy 'reported that "A certain section of the crowd appeared to be feeling the
pinch of hunger which is causing them to be wavering towards returning to work"
(16/2/30).) And it also fell to women to seek for extra income through activities
in the township economy. Perhaps the most important single source of earnings in
the informal sector was the brewing and sale of beer; and this became a crucial
issue for the IICU in 1930.
* It was not the case that all women workers were also brewers, nor did all
those who stayed out on strike turn personally to brewing, for it was to some
extent a specialist activity. However, quite large numbers of women in East London
did brew (in 1930/31 alone there were 1,992 prosecutions for illegal brewing) and
as the strike action persisted between February and May the recourse to brewing for
income seems to have increased. In addition, one of the ways in which the state
could retaliate against the strike (other than imprisoning the leaders and supporting
employers who fired strikers) was to tighten its controls over the townships.
Indeed, in February 1930 the police specifically warned that they would take stern
action against beer brewing, possession of liquor, and failure to hold lodgers'
permits. The heightened dependence on informal sector activities, coupled with
added police pressure in the townships, had the effect of making the Locations the
central arena of class conflict.
During the 1920s the East London town council remained officially wedded to
the outright prohibition of beer-brewing in the African locations. They had not,
that is, adopted either the "Durban model" (of outlawing domestic brewing but
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selling beer in profitable municipal beerhalls) or the "Bloemfontein model"
(of allowing limited brewing for domestic consumption but not for sale).
Despite the ban, beer brewing was regularly undertaken in East London in the
face of intermittent raids and prosecutions. Some of the beer was consumed
by those who brewed it; most was sold at three-halfpence per pint or 3/6d
for full (4 gallons ) paraffin tin. Although there were nearly 2000
prosecutions for brewing in 1930-31, an official commented that "the trade
'26 )
proceeds merrily". " Missionaries pressed for temperance; employers
grumbled about absenteeism; but some municipal officers recognised the
nutritional quality of the beverage and sought merely to control its traffic.
The wealthier educated elite, represented by those Africans on the Advisory
Board, strongly favoured the legalisation of domestic brewing. They opposed
beer halls (eventually opened in East London in 1938) as being both socially
ruinous and financially unfair; they regarded beer drinks, and their
attendant formalities, as quite unlike the intemperate and violent gatherings
sketched by disapproving whites. For the mass of location dwellers, the issue
was even more clear-cut. They were jealous of their right to drink beer, which
they valued not only as a means of relaxation but also as an expression of social
solidarity; and they also sought to establish the right to protect their own
living quarters from constant invasion by police. The interests of the women
who brewed the beer were direct and central. They depended on the income from
brewing to supplement low wages; they suffered from the arrests and prosecutions;
and the techniques used by the police constantly dramatised their lack of power
and status.
Before the formation of the Independent ICU in April 1929, ICU leaders in
East London were conspicuously reluctant to support these popular interests.
Instead, they opposed the location beer culture, arguing that beer drinking
detracted from potential support and income for the trade union. Similar attitudes
peppered the IICU speeches during 1929, although as more attention was directed
to popular grievances the first stray indications emerged of IICU awareness, that
the brewing ban (and other location issues) were important. On 19 May 1929, a
dramatic IICU meeting was held which began with a procession through the East
Bank Location behind a new banner (emblazoned with the slogan Vuka Africa Kusike -
Wake Up, Africa, It is the Dawn). On the reassembly, Mnika promised that the
Union was "going to do a great deal of work for the oppressed" and continued:
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every day natives are being arrested and sent to gaol
for selling Kaffir Beer and for not carrying passes.
The IICU is going to abolish this pass business, why
should you be chased by the policemen every day and
night, it causes much unhappiness ...
A week later, Keable Mote (in a speech already mentioned - see p.
told his audience that he had written to Location Superintendent Lloyd
"asking his permission for every native man to make one tin of Kaffir
Beer for his own use" as well as for the abolition of the system of
lodgers' permits, another location grievance. "I say you should be
allowed to brew Kaffir Beer" (Mote maintained)"at your huts the same
as they are allowed in Bloemfontein and at Port Elizabeth." ( 26.5.29)
Even so, the adoption of location brewing as an item in the IICU
programme provides a revealing study of how tentatively, even awkwardly,
the leadership reached at first for a handhold on this popular issue. When
the strike was launched, the Strike Committee urged workers to abstain
from drinking (so as to maintain discipline, and to deprive police of an
excuse for intervention) . Nor was the strike projected as a means to win
the right to brew, but rather as a way of making brewing financially
unnecessary:
Should we get the 6/6 it would be a means of preventing
you women from brewing Kaffir Beer. I know you only do
this to help your husbands to make ends meet. You know
the dangers of bringing brandy or brewing kaffir beer
in the locations. You do it, not for pleasure, you only
do it to raise money to assist in paying taxes ... (18/1/30)
This was essentially in line with the previous ICU position, and a far cry
from the values of those men - many recently arrived from rural areas - who
wanted to drink beer and to involve themselves in the cultural and social
activities associated with it. It was equally distant from the interests of
the women who depended on brewing for survival.
By May 1930, however, when the issues surrounding beer had become more
urgent to the township inhabitants the IICU could no longer afford to ignore
the question. Kadalie and the other leaders, returned from their trial, were
trying to re-establish their authority and popularity, and one of the ways in
which they did so was to champion certain township issues. Kadalie, addressing
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huge meetings at the end of May reiterated his earlier argument that IICU
success would render brewing unnecessary. This was small consolation for
women dependent on brewing and facing frequent police raids. Kadalie also
had advice for his audience on their relations with the police; township
people should "refrain from interfering with the police, don't pass remarks
against them, leave the attacking of them to us leaders, we know how far to go".
This clearly failed to satisfy the crowd (estimated at between eight and ten
thousand people). Kadalie was asked from the floor "If the police come to
interfere with us in our homes, such as to break our doors open in search of
Kaffir Beer, what are we to do?" Kadalie's reply ("Submit to arrest, don't
interfere with them, we know how to deal with them, we will sue the buggers")
may well have contributed to the inattentive behaviour of the crowd at this
meeting.
There were certainly a number of references in May and June to restlessness
in the crowds at IICU meetings. On May 29th, a meeting of 2000 people almost
ended in confusion when women in the crowd denounced Magade. (He had apparently
tried to turn away women holding a prayer meeting on the football ground, venue
of the IICU rally, where the women were offering prayers in support of the rank
and file committee members under arrest.) A questioner again demanded of the
leaders some protection against police action:
You called the strike off when you were arrested, we
listened and went back to work, rather we went looking
for work. Some of us couldn't find employment. The
position now is this: that we are being chased by the
Dutchmen (policemen) for lodgers' permits ...
Maduna attempted to soothe the meeting by calling on people with complaints
to bring them to the IICU office and not to air them in public. Within a
few days, however, Maduna and the other leaders redefined their position
so as to accommodate some of these popular grievances. Maduna announced that
the IICU would write to the Minister of Justice complaining about police
conduct in East London - explicitly, about their "continually breaking into
the native houses in search of Kaffir Beer". He also promised action on
"the carrying of lodgers' permits". (1/6/30) A few days later Mnika and others
undertook to meet the Location Superintendent and the Advisory Board "to
protest against the actions of the Police", assuring the women that they "had
the liquor question in hand" and inviting all with grievances to join the union
so that their cases could be dealt with individually.
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In June 1930, for the first time the. whole question of domestic brewing
became a central aspect of the IICU approach. Mnika called for "the
same laws ... as in Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein and Kroonstad permitting
every householder to make four gallons of beer". Indeed, he went further
than this in supporting the right to brew: in the other cities, he reminded
his audience, people "of course" brewed more beer than the official limit -
"I leave that to you how it is done." He praised the women present for the
effectiveness of their prayers while their leaders had been under arrest, and
attacked the Advisory Board whose members (he asserted) gave the police "the
right to enter your houses in search of Kaffir Beer". At the same meeting,
Maduna specifically invited "Kaffir beer brewers" to join the Independent
ICU so that the union could take appropriate action on their behalf against
the police. (8/6/30) The next meeting ended in further assurances that the
IICU would defeat the government over brewing, and "the people ... disappeared
in cheers".
Attendance at IICU meetings climbed steeply again (see fig 2) when the
leadership adopted these demands. Most prominently during June, and to a
lesser extent throughout the rest of 1930, the mobilisation around location
grievances helped sustain support for the IICU in the aftermath of the
unsuccessful strike. Individual cases of invasion of privacy by police were
pursued; organisers attacked the anomaly that, permitted some blacks (registered
voters) to buy liquor but withheld the right from the majority; and they
mounted a sweeping denunciation of police methods. Police were accused of planting
evidence in order to secure convictions, of using excsssive violence, of carrying
out raids in the small hours of the morning, and generally of displays of racial
animosity. "The police are after people", summed up Magade:
They look for beer, trouble you in your sleep, and
worry you day and night. Why don't you sue them? The
Sergeant himself with his dirty stripes has no right to
carry a lot of keys and open doors in your absence.
Say perhaps he has a bottle of brandy in his own
pocket, ... is he not going to lay a charge against
you ... for what he himself brought into your house? (9/6/30)
An aspect of the police raids which clearly caused a great deal of anger was the
way they dealt with any beer they discovered, tipping it out of its containers
wherever they found it. In the early months of 1931 this became an almost
constant motif of IICU rhetoric. Another approach to the whole question pursued
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vigorously in 1931 was the suggestion that the wrong people were being
punished for brewing. German and Jewish traders were free to visit the
location and sell imitombo (sprouted sorghuia, used mainly for brewing)
without fear of prosecution, while the women who processed the imitombo
were harried and fined.
(ii) The IICU and rural areas.
The final and perhaps most significant instance of ideological realignment
within the IICU is the increasing involvement of the union in rural mobilisation
during 1930 and 1931. This was not merely a matter of tactical support for
specific rural campaigns; it also saw populist rural consciousness penetrate
the urban movement, as several aspects of rural ideology filtered through into
the speeches and politicking of the IICU organisers. These developments served
to shift the stance of the movement more broadly: that the separatist tendencies
in the IICU ideology were confirmed; that its radical independent religious
message intensified; and that the leadership found itself being pushed into
a novel and distinctive local and traditional idiom. In many ways, the existing
Africanism of the movement enabled these new features to be incorporated, and in
a sense this was a direct outcome of the movements search for rural allies. But
the prominence of the folk ideology and its millenialist overtones indicate a
partial capture of the movement by its new rural constituencies. This capture,
and the ideological pressures it generated, were increasingly to be resisted by
the urban leadership, and ultimately led to the disintegration of the urban/rural
alliance briefly established.
There was of course a considerable legacy from the days of the parent ICU
of embroilment in rural conflict. The ICU had been enlisted in the fierce local
struggles waged by farm labourers and tenants in the mid-twenties. The East
London branch of the ICU had made some forays into the Transkei and Ciskei
before 1929: Theo Lujiza was the organiser with special responsibility for.rural
mobilisation. In Kentani (which district was a major provider of Gcaleka labourers
in East London) Lujiza claimed a "big membership" by 1927. There were also
branches opened in Bizana and Ngqeleni (in Mpondoland) in 1928 and 1929 - although
not with conspicuous success. The ICU was able to win the co-operation of some
rural chiefs and headmen before 1929, and these links were later to be strengthened
by the Independent ICU. The IICU organisers who duplicated Lujiza's efforts in
rural areas were Elias Mabodla and Joel Magade. Himself from Tabankulu in
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Mpondoland, Magade had retained strong rural links (he referred to Tabankulu
as "home") and he was one of the main channels through which rural concerns
and language flowed into the IICU.
In the first months of its existence, the IICU expanded its involvement
in rural areas. This seems to have occurred in large measure because of
approaches from country districts - sometimes from.people who already had
links with the union and sometimes from men who sought such a relationship.
Indeed, if one feature of the period April-December 1929 was the interest
expressed in the IICU by several Ciskeian and Transkeian chiefs, another was
the increasingly cordial response to them by IICU speakers. Chief Mqcwezulu
of Kingwilliamstown, grandson of Mtirara, explained that he had travelled to
East London "to meet the committee to request them to send a man amongst my
people to organise them .... I like this Independent ICU because it unites
our people." (16/6/29) In terms of recruitment, Kentani was the most responsive
district; Mabodla and Magade, assisted by the local man Dorrington Mqayi,
signed up sizeable numbers of members. (14/10/29, 3/11/29, 17/11/29)
The rural communities showing the keenest interest in the IICU were
among the more traditionalist country areas, particularly in Kingwilliamstown
district and amidst Gcaleka groups in Kentani. These communities had not been
very receptive to the modernising political initiatives led by mission-educated
"new men" at the turn of the century. Now, as in several other rural movements
described in this book, they were more strongly attracted by the radical and
Africanist tones of a different group of educated leaders. The changing
ideology of the IICU - its emphatic Africanism and its radical rhetoric - served
as a. bridge between the urban-based leadership and the new rural constituency.
The IICU leaders, in a number of respects, resembled the populist activists
in Qumbu, Idutywa; Mount Fletcher or Herschel. Although educated, they had
broken away from the missions and white liberals; although coming from petty
bourgeoise occupations they were pushing beyond the programme of self-
improvement, the patient pursuit of reform, and the concern to establish
special treatment for an educated and "civilised" elite. These departures
were what enabled them to broaden their appeal and to mobilise rural communities
hitherto little swayed by petty bourgeoise political appeals. The difference
between the populism of the IICU leaders and the local mission-bound modernising
elite was illustrated on a number of occasions. In Bizana, for instance, the
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IICU meetings were disrupted by "the educated natives of the village and
district"; the supporters "mainly consisted of women and a few of the raw
( 7l)
natives". *' In Kentani, the local Vigilance Association attacked the
IICU in these terms:
Their propaganda is not conducive to proper relations
and cooperation with the government, and is inclined to
divide the ignorant masses from the more intelligent,
law-abiding classes, thus removing those safeguards which
have been set up by a community which seeks to represent
their grievances in a constitutional way for the protection
of law, order and constituted authority. (27)
Nor was the ideological transmission in one direction only: at the same
time that the union's message began to be heard with more interest in rural
communities, the language and symbolism of pre-colonial Xhosa heroism
bulked larger in IICU speeches. The references to the Xhosa past now
went beyond Ntsikana, representative of independent Xhosa Christianity,
and included Hintsa and other representatives of a Xhosa/Gcaleka tradition
of resistance. Hintsa, the last independent Gcaleka chief, tricked and
killed during the war of 1835, served as a potent rallying point both in the
circumstances of his death and as a warrior. Hintsa had been "shot in cold
blood", Tyamzashe reminded his hearers - "my heart is sore, I want you all
to be sore about that." Or, as another speaker encouraged the crowd, "the
bone of Hintsa will get up again and help us". (6.1.30)
References to a specifically Xhosa tradition would have appealed to
migrant workers in East London audiences; but they were also one of the
ways in which the IICU leadership sought to confirm or strengthen their
alliance with Xhosa chiefs. During the strike of 1930, the IICU attempted
to capitalise on those links with chiefs already established. For one thing,
they looked to chiefs for gifts of grain and cattle with which to feed the
strikers; secondly, through the chiefs the union could try to prevent the
recruitment of rural scab labour; and thirdly, it was important for the
IICU leadership to demonstrate to striking workers the reality of external
support. In the same way that Kadalie read telegrams of encouragement from
overseas and elsewhere in South Africa, he also looked to the chiefs for expressions
of rural solidarity. On the first day of the strike, Kadalie promised that "the
Native chiefs tbroughout the country have no time for the Government: they
correspond with me privately; we are going to get cattle from these chiefs
to feed you*" This was echoed by Gcaleka chief Pakamela from Kentani when he
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travelled to East London to tell a large crowd: "You will see that Hertzog
can no more depend too much on the loyalty of the Native chiefs." (21/1/30)
During the strike, visiting chiefs made a number of forceful speeches
in favour of the urban action, emphasising the national and land questions.
The "rightful owners of this land were the red natives", said Pakamela and
Sigidi attended a meeting of 3000 people on 25th January 1930, at which the
latter spoke in this vein:
I thank you that so many of you are in the likeness of your
fathers who were killed by the whiteman. I say you must
be prepared to die in this field in the same way as your
fathers did ... We have no intention of killing one who
belongs to our own race. Those who go to work we are going
to kill. Those who declare themselves Europeans, leave,
get out.
Sigidi fused Xhosa identity and strike action; this powerful message of
mobilisation was one which the chiefs were uniquely in a position to
deliver. (Equally, it was probably a great help to Nonkonyane that
Sigidi - who "had great sway with the local natives" - remained in East
London and sided with the clergyman in restraining the anger of the rank
and file die-hards.)
The months of strike action witnessed a surge of support for the IICU
in Transkei districts where the union already had a footing. At one point
Magade claimed over 5000 members in Kentani and 4000 in Idutywa: these
figures may be of dubious accuracy, but IICU meetings in these districts
were certainly able to draw large crowds and evoked a real enthusiasm (
Those meetings were partly aimed at drumming up rural subscriptions or collections
in aid of the arrested strike committee (in Kentani, the appeals were made in
the name of the local man, Mqayi) but the occasions could also be directed to
purely rural grievances. Mabodla, addressing a meeting in Kentani in March
1930, was asked "if we are united, will the police still prosecute us for noxious
weeds?" - and he answered that solidarity would defeat the police: "they cannot
(29)
put the whole district in gaol." Other rural issues - the reporting of
cattle deaths, taxation, and the economic power of white traders ("these white •
traders never go to the mines to work for money, neither do they plough") -
became part of the union's concerns in Kentani. The effects of labour migrancy
were especially deplored: "Look at those native women, they are widows; their
husbands are at work in the mines."
In the second half of 1930, the IICU effort in Kentani was badly damaged
by financial scandals and feuding within the leadership there. During these
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same months, the union was also making a concerted push into what were
called the "outside locations" of East London: areas of black tenancy or
land-ownership at Nahoon, Newlands, and Mooiplaats. The IICU seems to have
-been responding to the needs of communities already seething with discontent
and impatient with the meagre channels open to them for redress. At Nahoon,
long-standing grievances over dog-taxes, dipping-taxes, and poll-tax were
caught up into IICU speeches; in all these rural meeting places, the
speakers endorsed popular demands for more land. When Mnika visited Mooiplaats,
he placed himself firmly in the lineage of rural legitimacy: "I am Mnika,
Mwari isibongi;[his traditional praise name], I belong to Hintsa's family." (3.9*30)
It was not merely that support for rural grievances was a way of
attracting rural members. The IICU leaders were also clearly aware that
these issues were of relevance and importance to their urban audiences.
Full, detailed accounts were relayed to East London meetings of IICU
agitation in the Ciskeian and Transkeian hinterland. The union mounted
campaigns in defence of land-holders who complained of being cheated out of
their farms; sought redress over wages for farm workers; and addressed a
range of rural topics including bans on beer drinks and traditional dances,
the need for African-owned shops to buy peasant produce, the evils of mine
recruiting, and so on. Many IICU members in East London itself were affected
by just these matters, either directly or through their families. The IICU
rhetoric specifically included rural people in the concept of a black nation,
and also singled out the category of rural women for particular mention. "In
outside locations" (reported Siyo) "where we went to address some meetings,
red native females dragged their blankets to meet us .... the red native women
joined and took IICU tickets." (24.8.30)
In the same way that popular township consciousness forced its way into
the discourse of the IICU leadership, in 1930 the work in the rural areas
altered the content and scope of the union's rhetoric. Explanations and
prescriptions were modified by elements of rural, traditionalist ideology.
In particular, there was an infusion of popular rural idioms of magic and
millenialism. These were frequently bound up with an insurrectionist strand
in rural ideology (similar to that already noted in the urban townships):
Magade returned from a tour in the Transkei to report that the Gcalekas there
said "that this IICU is too slow in taking action against these Europeans
who are the exploiters and oppressors of the native sons of Africa. They say
let us take a short way against them." ( S.1T.30) Violence was predicted,
rather than preached: "I am telling you, there is a great trouble still coming.
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something that would make the strike look small" ( 9.11.30) was a
typical warning, which could take on strongly prophetic tones when rendered
in rural idiom. Magade told an East London meeting "There is in Kentani
district a crow which can speak and it tells the AmaXhosa to join the
organisation, and it says there is a great war coming." ( 12.11.30)
Magical and millenial powers became attached, at rural meetings, to the
physical emblems of IICU organisation, the yellow membership tickets. "The
only way to protect the natives from that horrible trouble is to join the
organisation and have a yellow ticket." Millenial currents had run deep
and long in rural Xhosa ideology. Nonquase's prophecies, had been central
to the cattle-killing of 1857; Magade and others now invoked her memory
in order to push the message of solidarity: "Nonquase - prophesied that the
AmaXhosas should be united. Today we are carrying pick-axes, so as to dig
out the Kaffir corn treasure ..." Magade may well have used the idiom of
millenial deliverance in an instrumental manner, but their apocalyptic urgency
and their reliance on deliverance by supernatural agency could at times subvert
the IICU message of urban organisers- A graphic instance of this had occurred
in Pondoland in 1928, where the name of the ICU had-been absorbed into a millenialist
movement demanding the killing of pigs and destruction of food as a protection
against destruction by lightning. Magade at one point actually warned his
audience against believing that "a fire will drop from heavens"; yet he himself
was prepared to invoke supernatural vengeance on renegades; "I tell you that if
you don't follow the prophecies of your ancestors ... then bad luck will fall
on you. "
The vocabulary of prophecy and millenialism may have been particularly
audible at some of the prayer meetings and other gatherings largely attended
by women in East London. (There is a good deal of evidence from other studies
that women were attracted by independent Christian rhetoric and in some cases
by its radical and millenialist urgings.) For the most part, the content of these
meetings went unrecorded; the police were intent instead on following the
activities of leading "agitators" and they attended mainly the more formal
gatherings of the IICU. But in October 1930, presumably because Kadalie was
also present. Constable Magamle went to "an IICU Church Service". His laconic
account of the occasion provides a fascinating example of the kind of ideological
juxtaposition and imbrication that could take place- After Kadalie's address,
Selina Bungane, a woman of about forty, spoke. Magamle described her as coming
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from a rural homestead in the Keiskammahoek district; she was then working
as "a kitchen girl, at the Strand Hotel"; in the next breath he added
"She is a member of the IICU and a prophetess." Bungane
said she was a prophetess ... said she received a message
from God that let all the natives listen to what Kadalie
tells them. God has revealed to her that Kadalie is the only
leader who is going to uplift Africa. She again has
received a message from the Almighty God that Kadalie should
go to Gcalekaland in the Transkei and-organise the AmaXhosas
at the Great Place of the Paramount Chief Ngangomhlaba. Again
the natives should pick out a certain day every year to remind
themselves of the public holiday of the late prophet Ntsikana.
I want to tell you this: there are some dangerous locusts
riding on the ass and they will bite all those people who
refuse to accept Kadalie's teaching. (5.10.30)
Selina Bungane's speech is a complex but revealing fragment of consciousness.
It is an admixture of concern for organisation, the language of separatist
Christianity, prophetic folk culture, and an acceptance of traditional
rural political authorities. The logical sequence of these elements, as
well as their diversity, was part of what the IICU leadership had to respond
to as it reached out to a rural base.
(6) RETROSPECT AND CONCLUSION
Pressure from the rank and file membership - urban and rural - on IICU
rhetoric could work to define new issues, leading to their ventilation and
their assimilation into the broad programme of the movement. Pressure from
below could also manifest itself in messages far harder to incorporate in
IICU policy and practices. Diffuse and contradictory ideological modes
could not always be amalgamated; sometimes they scraped and jarred against
one another. In many instances, the IICU was, flexible enough to incorporate
what Rude has called "structured" or "derived" ideology (calls for union
organisation or nation-building) with what he dubs traditional or "inherent"
rural ideology (like the prophetic and supernatural elements of the folk
O')
culture). At times, however, the blend failed; the penetration of inherent
elements caused an ideological reaction.
The shifts in language and tactics were not always made easily or willingly
by the leadership. This was true both in urban and rural contexts. Although
the IICU's adoption of location grievances (especially brewing and lodgers
permits) enabled it to mobilise popular support in mid-1930, by the end of that
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year the union organisers were beginning to soft-pedal these issues. Indeed,
by 1931 there are clear signs that at least some of the leaders were becoming
impatient with demands being made on them in regard to township grievances.
They were returning to the nationalist concerns and resorting to the highly
generalised radical rhetoric of the pre-strike period. Siyo (who started
sharing IICU platforms at the beginning of 1931) actually argued that the
movement should drop township issues and pursue broader nationalist goals
instead:
Some say if IICU people are doing something right, they just
first of all fight against the Kaffir Beer Act. The Police are
arresting native females for brewing kaffir beer in the location.
I myself say that if these non-IICU people wish that we should
fight against the police who arrest native females for brewing
kaffir beer they had better give up, because we will never do
that . You must come and join the union.and leave those useless
complaints which you have about your unhappy living in the location,
for they will not build us as a nation .... I could tell'you to do
away with the kaffir beer if you want to be a free nation. (1/2/31)
Siyo was later accused of being an informer, and drummed out of the IICU; but
the direction in which he was pointing on this issue was being followed by other
speakers, including Kadalie. Organisers were arguing in 1931 that if brewers
wanted long term action they should become union members, and they accused
women of holding back the growth of the organisation.
When it came to negotiating on township issues, the IICU leaders generally
sought compromise with municipal and government authorities. Thus, they backed .
off from the popular call for the abolition of lodgers' permits, accepting the
police position and "therefore advis [ing] the native females to go to the
Superintendent Location Office and get a lodger's permit." (3/8/30) Demands
to employers for wages not paid while workers were on strike were (perhaps
understandably) pursued in gingerly fashion. By the end of 1930, the IICU did
not have a great deal to offer its urban members. Many who had paid their
subscriptions to the union were becoming restless. Whereas the leadership had
been able to justify the constant collections and cash demands in the months
leading up to the strike, they were now less able to do so. They still held
out promises of long term gains: the possibility of another, better organised,
strike was floated; the claim was made that with black unity even the aeroplanes
of the white man could be defeated. But these exhortations had become devalued
amongst members who had lost their jobs, and who felt that they were being further
oppressed by tougher police action on lodgers' permits and brewing.
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It was in this context that the tensions between rank and file members
and the leadership began to manifest.themselves. Meetings in East London
became the venue for angry exchanges between organisers and followers, not
least the women members. Kadalie recounted a fraught confrontation with one
Lydia: she had paid her membership dues, but now demanded "What is
organisation?" and accused Kadalie and Mnika - "You stole the IICU money." {9/11/30
In 1931, such complaints were defined more precisely and pressed more regularly.
Kadalie's drinking, the motor car bought for the •committee, the instances of
outright theft were all cited as abuses of rank and file subscriptions. Attendance
at meetings began to fall off as the leaders began to fall out. Large crowds
might still turn out when mobilised by particular events; in March 1931 6000
people attended an IICU meeting to protest against police brutality against a
township woman; but the levels of mobilisation achieved in 1930 were
increasingly difficult to maintain.
The strains apparent in the urban movement were mirrored in the IlCU's
rural branches. The push into rural areas - like the adoption of township
issues - had had a contradictory impact on the organisation. It instilled a
new vigour and dynamism in the IICU and broadened its appeal; it also opened
new chasms between popular demands and the leaderships ability to satisfy
them. In 1931, at the same time that the leaders ran into problems with
their urban rank and file, accusations of waste and corruption began to
punctuate reports of rural meetings. Chief Sigidi now advised his adherents
to leave the IICU, saying that the money was being spent for the benefit of
a few and reporting that the ordinary members in East London were disillusioned.
In Mooiplaats, the IICU branch split into two factions; Mabodla, the Kentani
organiser who had been dismissed for corruption, now set up a rival "National
Union" which sought members largely in the rural districts around East London.
The IICU did manage to sustain a dwindling rural presence for the next couple
of years. But when Mnika (faced with the fall-off in urban enthusiasm) argued
that "the leaders have finished preaching to the East London natives, but should
now go out and preach to the natives in the countryside" (18/8/31) he was
effectively too late.
Popular expectations, in short, had been raised; but such was the power
of the state and employers that the union could do little to. satisfy them.
The leadership had responded to, and used, popular energies in expanding their
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organisation; now they found that these same energies were causing
internal tensions. It was one of the central conundrums facing the IICU
leadership. In order to mobilise the people in East London and the
countryside they had to move beyond wage demands and narrowly defined
trade union concerns; in doing so, they promised more than they could
deliver; thus they made the programme of the movement more fragile by
adopting an immediatist popular perspective that virtually invited its
own defeat.
The pattern of popular disaffection and leadership disputes became
clear during 1931 and 1932. Kadalie attempted to shift the blame for
financial mismanagement onto the East London IICU stalwarts, Magade and
Mnika. An uneasy accommodation was reached between them, until in 1932
Kadalie again found himself facing legal costs and demanded more money,
becoming increasingly arrogant in his approach. Magade, Mnika and Vandla
finally broke with him; they went so far as to contact the police to request
action against Kadalie. Kadalie tried to offset the defection of his
lieutenants by maintaining popular support: he even arranged an attempted
negotiation on beer brewing in April 1932 (although the Town Council
remained obdurate). Kadalie succeeded in keeping the support of the women
members, and his section was able to dominate the Sunday .-meetings throughout
1932. In June of that year a motion of No Confidence in Kadalie was passed
at the IICU Eastern Cape conference; but the Eastern Cape leaders hesitated
from dismissing him completely lest they lose the popular support that Kadalie
still attracted. It was amidst infighting and wrangling that the IICU faded
into insignificance in 1933. It is not enough, as several existing accounts
do, to deplore or ridicule this denouement; to understand it, we are suggesting,
it is necessary to comprehend something of the ideological and political
contradictions which underlay the welter of factionalism and the accusations
of corruption.
Two final conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis. The difficulties
and demise of the IICU should not be allowed to obscure the nature of its
• achievement, nor its importance in the history of popular struggles in South
Africa. Like the ICU in its heyday, the IICU between 1929 and 1932 spanned
both urban and rural popular movements; organisationally, it served as a bridge
- 53 "
between variegated communities and provided leadership to inchoate and
shifting underclass elements; ideologically, it incorporated many of the
desires and demands of these classes. While the Rank and File Committee
in East London was more militant than the formal leadership, and while it
adopted tactics of civil disobedience (like the demonstration and demands
for mass imprisonment) more venturesome than those of the Strike Committee,
it is also clear that the rank and file movement sprang out of the
mobilisation and organisation already achieved by the IICU. The task
confronting the IICU - to provide political leadership for a constituency
as socially diverse and culturally fragmented as that in the townships and
rural areas - was immensely daunting. The partial and short-lived nature of
its success looks all the more impressive if it is compared with the more
limited achievements of other organisations in the 1920s, 1930s, and after.
Secondly, this study of the IICU in East London has (like other chapters
in this book) demonstrated the resilience and autonomy of localised traditionalist
or inherent ideologies of protest, especially but not uniquely in rural areas.
The nature of much popular consciousness has not been fully recognised, let
alone adequately analysed, in the reconstruction of South Africa's recent past.
The essays in this book suggest the reality and the complexity of that
consciousness - and also illustrate the political challenges that they posed
to historical actors and nationalist organisers at the time.
In South Africa in the mid-1980s, black trade unionism, unemployment, police
surveillance, and the problems of linking "insider" urban struggles with
"outsider" rural struggles lie close to the heart of contemporary class conflict.
The fifty year old documents on which this essay is based have something to say
about these issues. They are part of an historical legacy of resistance, and
the legacy has not been fully claimed. One ICU stalwart who clearly had a
concept of a "usable past" was A.W.G. Champion. Addressing a meeting in East
London on 12th December 1930 he said: "What I want you to do is to keep your
native Cape history. It must be written and kept for future generations."
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Note on Sources
This paper is based very largely upon a single archival source: the
police reports collected in C A, 1/ELN vols 86, file C3 (1) and 87, file
C3(2). These reports date from 1928 to 1933, and consist in the main of
accounts by black and white policemen of meetings which they attended. The
reports are usually headed "Native Agitation"; and include details of meetings
organised by other individuals and groups (such as the Wellington Movement,
the Cape ANC, etc.),- but they are preponderantly concerned with ICU and
IICU meetings- held in and.near East London.
The reports provide a record of organisational activity: each one records
the date and venue of the meeting, the names of the speakers, and number of
people attending them, and details of any actions undertaken (such as cash
collections, votes, petitions, etc.). Moreover, the reports also contain a
record of what was actually said: they are essential verbatim or precis accounts
of speeches. In some cases, the policemen merely summarised the drift of an
address ("The speaker then became abusive, and blamed Europeans for oppressing
the natives") but more usually they attempted to record the main points and
sequence of what was said.
There is no attempt at literary polish in the reports: much is garbled,
ungrammatical and obviously shortened. At times, however, something is captured
of the flow and imagery of men who were highly regarded as orators. Certainly,
the reports enable the historian to discover what topics were discussed and with
what frequency and to learn something of the idiom and vocabulary in which they
were couched. We have not attempted to edit or improve the language of the reports
(even when it plainly did little justice to the original speeches), other than
adding some punctuation so as to aid reading, and correcting obvious spelling errors
All documentary sources have their own limitations, lacunae, and biases; and
the question of deliberate distortion has frequently been raised when we have
presented some of this material in seminars or lectures. How trustworthy are the
East London policemen in their accounts? Might they not have been trying to.frame
the IICU leaders? So far as we are able to judge, these are not serious problems
in using this archival source. The intention of the police reports was to provide
an accurate record of what was taking place, and not collecting evidence for use in
court cases. In some cases, more than one report was filed, by different reporters.
for the same meetings: their content reveals a high degree of agreement on
what was said. Even more convincing corroboration, we believe, comes from
prolonged reading of the reports: their internal consistency is striking.
Even through their unadorned prose it is possible to recognose the oratorical style
of individual speakers; and in reports filed over many months it is possible to
identify the way new topics are introduced, explored, and elaborated. It would
not have been possible for any policemen then serving in the East London S.A.P.
to have invented - and sustained - the changing content of these speeches.
